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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Meian Chen 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Political Science 
 
June 2016 
 
Title: Seizing the Opportunity: Climate Politics in the Developing World 
 
 
My research asks how and why some developing countries have adopted ambitious 
climate policies, while others have not. As developing countries have no international 
obligations and little domestic public support for undertaking climate change action, it is 
puzzling to see them taking substantial steps to counteract global warming. I argue that 
such policies are due to a strong pro-climate policy group, which arises because of the 
interaction of international institutions and a shift in domestic politics. Specifically, 
international institutions helped to cultivate a pro-climate policy group through 
international socialization and economic incentives between the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
The changes in domestic politics after the mid-2000s, particularly policy decision makers’ 
rising energy and environmental concerns, strengthened the power of the pro-climate 
policy group. Due to the interplay of international institutions and the development of 
domestic actors, the pro-climate policy group was able to advance their interests in climate 
policymaking process and advocated for a proactive climate policy. 
 
 v 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
 
NAME OF AUTHOR: Meian Chen 
 
 
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: 
 
 University of Oregon, Eugene 
 Oregon State University, Corvallis  
 Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian, China  
  
 
DEGREES AWARDED: 
 
 Doctor of Philosophy, Political Science, 2016, University of Oregon 
 Master of Arts, Political Science, 2014, University of Oregon 
            Master of Public Policy, Public Policy, 2010, Oregon State University  
 Bachelor of Arts, Public Administration, 2008, Dongbei University of Finance 
and Economics  
 
 
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: 
 
 International Relations 
 Environmental Politics  
 
 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: 
 
            Instructor, Department of Political Science, University of Oregon, 2015-2016 
 
 Graduate Teaching Fellow, Department of Political Science, University of 
Oregon, 2010-2015 
  
            Graduate Research Assistant, Department of Political Science, Oregon State 
University, 2008-2010  
 
 
GRANTS, AWARDS, AND HONORS: 
 
 Center for Asian and Pacific Studies Small Professional Grant, University of 
Oregon, 2015 
 
 Department Nominee for UO Doctoral Research Fellowship, University of 
Oregon, 2015 
 
 vi 
           William C. Mitchell Summer Research Award, University of Oregon, 2013                                                                          
 
           ICPSR Summer Fellowship, University of Oregon, 2013 
     
           Graduate Teaching Fellowship, University of Oregon, 2010-2016 
     
           Graduate Research Fellowship, Oregon State University, 2008-2010
 vii 
     
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I wish to express sincere appreciation to many people for their assistance in the 
preparation of this manuscript. First, I would like to thank my dissertation committee. My 
deepest gratitude is to my advisor, Professor Ronald Mitchell, who has guided me 
through every stage of my research and has provided insightful and prompt feedback on 
my manuscript in its every version. As my teacher and mentor, he has taught me a great 
deal about both research and life. I am also indebted to Professor Lars Skalnes for his 
guidance and encouragement. The productive and valuable discussions I had with him 
have helped me sort out many research questions and led me to continue to pursue my 
research career. I am also grateful to Professor Karrie Koesel for her constant support and 
encouragement. Her familiarity with comparative politics and fieldwork research has 
guided me to develop and enrich my research. Special thanks are due to Professor Xiaobo 
Su, who has always been there to listen and give me very helpful advice.  
I also own many thanks to Professor Arafaat Valiani at the Department of History 
and Dr. Hu Tao in the World Wildlife Fund, who have provided invaluable assistance and 
extensive information for my case studies in India and China. Throughout my fieldwork 
in China, I thank Chinese environmentalists, officials and climate experts who have been 
extraordinarily generous in sharing their expertise with me. My research also benefits 
greatly from valuable suggestions from Professor William Terry, Professor Craig 
Kauffman and Professor David Steinberg at the Department of Political Science. My 
sincere thanks go to the Department of Political Science and the Center for Asian and 
Pacific Studies at the University of Oregon for their financial support. Finally, I am ever 
grateful for the love and support from my wonderful family and friends.   
 viii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For my parents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ix 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter Page 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  ................................................................................................... 1 
 Argument in Brief .................................................................................................. 3 
 Scholarship on Global Climate Politics ................................................................. 6 
 
 Methodological Approach ..................................................................................... 8 
  
 The Outline of the Research .................................................................................. 10 
II. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES ............................................................................ 13 
 Dependent Variable and Conceptual Definitions .................................................. 13 
 International Commitments ............................................................................. 14 
 Domestic Climate Progress .............................................................................. 15 
 Hypotheses: Variables Influencing Climate Policies ............................................. 18 
        Political Explanations ..................................................................................... 18 
              International Institutions ........................................................................... 18 
                         Scientific and environmental Discourses ............................................ 19 
                         Economic Incentives  .......................................................................... 23 
                   Political System ........................................................................................ 24 
                   Domestic Interest Groups ......................................................................... 26 
                   Environmental NGOs ................................................................................ 28 
            Economic Explanations ................................................................................... 30 
            Environmental Explanations ............................................................................ 33 
                   Local Air Pollution ................................................................................... 33 
 x 
Chapter Page 
 
III. METHODS AND ANALYSIS .............................................................................. 34 
 Empirical Analysis ................................................................................................. 36 
 Variables .......................................................................................................... 36 
 Research Design ............................................................................................... 40 
      Case Selection ........................................................................................................ 46 
IV. CLIMATE POLITICS IN INDIA ......................................................................... 51 
      Shift in India’s Climate Policy ............................................................................... 53 
           Changes in International Stance ........................................................................ 55 
           Changes in Domestic Climate Action ............................................................... 58 
      The Impact of International Dynamic .................................................................... 62 
 Scientific and Environmental Discourses ........................................................    63 
 Economic Incentives…. ...................................................................................    67 
            International Pressure .......................................................................................    70 
      The Impact of Domestic Dynamic ......................................................................... 73 
            Change in Energy Governance ........................................................................ 74 
            Change in Climate Change Bureaucracy ......................................................... 78 
       Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 82 
V. CLIMATE POLITICS IN CHINA ......................................................................... 85 
      Shift in China’s Climate Policy ............................................................................. 87 
            Changes in International Stance ....................................................................... 89 
 
 
  
 xi 
 
 
Chapter Page 
         
           Changes in Domestic Climate Action ............................................................... 91 
     The Impact of International Dynamic ..................................................................... 94 
 Scientific and Environmental Discourses ........................................................    95 
 Economic Incentives…. ...................................................................................    99 
     The Impact of Domestic Dynamic .......................................................................... 104 
            Challenges to China’s Legitimacy ................................................................... 105 
            Climate Governance under Legitimacy Consolidation .................................... 108 
                 Maintaining Legitimacy .............................................................................. 109 
                 Strengthening the Power of the Pro-climate Group .................................... 111 
      Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 119 
VI. CONCLUSION...................................................................................................... 121 
      Summary of the Findings ....................................................................................... 121 
      Implications for Theory and Practice ..................................................................... 126 
APPENDICES ............................................................................................................. xii 
 A. LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................... xii 
 B. LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................ xiii 
REFERENCES CITED ................................................................................................ 130 
 xii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure Page 
 
 
1. Causal Model ......................................................................................................... 4 
2. Case Selection ........................................................................................................ 48 
 xiii 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table Page 
 
 
1. The Operationalization and Data Sources for Independent Variables ................... 40 
2. Bivariate Correlation Coefficients ......................................................................... 43 
3. Multivariate Regression Analysis .......................................................................... 43 
4. Timeline of India’s Climate Policy ........................................................................ 54 
5. Timeline of China’s Climate Policy ...................................................................... 88 
6. Results of Empirical Work ..................................................................................... 121 
 1 
 
CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
While slow and cumbersome progress is being made in the negotiations for the 
post-Kyoto period, considerable progress on climate change has been made by some 
developing countries (Global International, 2013; Pew Charitable Trusts, 2010; UNEP, 
2013). From large emitters such as China and India, to small emitters such as Kenya, 
Vietnam and Colombia, countries have begun to take actions on climate change. Some 
developing countries, such as China and Brazil, have begun increasing their investment in 
renewable energy as well as setting up voluntary and quantified targets on emissions 
reduction based on their pledges in international negotiations. For the first time in the 
history of international climate negotiations, there are developing countries taking 
substantial action on climate change (Chandler et al., 2002; Hurrell & Sengupta, 2012).  
The transformation of climate actions in developing countries is puzzling, and 
poses a challenge to both theories of public goods and of environmental politics (Najam, 
2005b; Steinberg, 2003; Williams, 2005). In the face of a global public good like climate 
change, we would expect developing countries to free ride on the efforts of developed 
countries. As benefits of climate stabilization are non-excludable, developing countries 
could benefit from climate mitigation without contributing to emissions reduction 
(Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990; Young, 1989). In addition, as developing 
countries have no binding obligation to reduce carbon emissions,1 they could use the 
                                                
1 Developing countries are listed as non-Annex I countries, and are exempted from mandatory emissions 
reduction based on the Kyoto Protocol.  
 2 
institutionalized principle of “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities” (CBDR) to 
defend their inaction.2 However, the last decade has witnessed a shift in some developing 
countries’ responses to climate change. Some of them have not only announced their 
voluntary quantified targets on emissions ceiling, but also reduced their emphasis on the 
norm of CBDR in negotiations.  
More surprisingly, climate change has little domestic public support in democratic 
developing countries and is not a priority for policymakers in less-democratic countries. 
Many developing countries have a large proportion of their population living in poverty, 
and there is no basis for expecting support for environmental protection out of the “post-
materialistic” concerns of high-income citizens (Inglehart, 1995). Also, in the developing 
world, people of a variety of backgrounds and income levels share the view that 
development requires macroeconomic growth, and fear that climate stabilization will 
constrain their access to cheap energy sources which has made their development 
possible to date (Kartha, 2011). Facing challenges of poverty alleviation and economic 
growth, policymakers in developing countries tend to prioritize technological and 
financial advancement over the environment (Grossman & Krueger, 1994; Stern, 2004). 
Yet, despite these considerations, developing countries have started to make voluntary 
actions on climate change and to implement a series of climate policies and measures. 
 
 
                                                
2 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its related Kyoto 
Protocol has established a principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” (Bernauer, Böhmelt, & 
Koubi, 2013). Thus, developing countries have insisted that developed countries should take a major 
responsibility for climate change, and that any measures adopted in negotiations not hinder their 
development. 
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Argument in Brief  
My explanation for the strength of climate policy lies in a pro-climate domestic 
policy community, which developed because of the interplay of international institutions 
and domestic political dynamic. As indicated in Figure 1, one of the factors that helped to 
cultivate this pro-climate policy community were international institutions, working 
through international scientific and environmental discourses and economic incentives at 
an early stage of a country’s engagement in international negotiations. It facilitated the 
emergence of pro-climate domestic actors with roots in scientific, environmental and 
business communities. Through scientific and environmental discourses, international 
institutions enabled climate experts to bring scientific concerns of climate change into 
domestic policy debates. Through economic incentives such as the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), international institutions stimulated climate mitigation by 
government officials and business groups. Another factor has been the domestic political 
dynamic, particularly policy decision makers’ rising energy and environmental concerns. 
It strengthened the power of the pro-climate policy group in the domestic policymaking 
process. Due to the interaction of international institutions and the development of 
domestic actors, the pro-climate policy group was able to advance their interests in 
climate policymaking process and advocated for a proactive climate policy.  
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Figure 1. Causal Model. 
 
The statistical analysis provides a preliminary confirmation of the significant 
effect of international institutions and regime type on the strength of a country’s climate 
policy. I use case studies to trace the causal mechanisms of interactions between 
international and domestic actors, and to capture variation in the efforts made by local 
actors to put climate change on the policy agenda. Based on my statistical analysis, I 
selected an “on-the-line” case, India, to examine how the causal mechanism works in a 
general cross-case relationship. Evidence from India reveals how domestic climate 
advocates reframed climate change in India’s domestic policy debates. These domestic 
pro-climate actors, such as the epistemic and business communities, empowered by 
global environmental governance, along with bureaucrats who see linkages between 
climate change and India’s international aspirations and domestic energy concerns, are 
working together to persuade the government of India to pursue an ambitious climate 
policy.  
I also selected an “off-the-line” case, China, to explore why an authoritarian 
developing country would have a more ambitious climate policy than what the statistical 
model predicts. Drawing on my fieldwork in China, I find that, while the pro-climate 
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actors are increasing due to China’s engagement with international institutions, it is only 
when they gain support from the highest levels of the party-state that they can change the 
outcome of bureaucratic bargaining to one favoring an aggressive climate policy. The 
change in the top leadership’s attitude towards climate change is largely due to their 
concern with maintaining high rates of economic growth, something which is becoming 
increasingly difficult in part because of China’s vulnerable resource-intensive economy 
and fragile ecological environment. Since the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist party 
depends crucially on its ability to deliver high rates of economic growth, the party 
leadership seeks to develop a “Low-Carbon Economy,” which requires economic 
transformation and higher energy efficiency. The development of a low carbon economy 
coincides with the objectives of climate change mitigation. Thus, the party leadership’s 
focus on economic transformation and greater energy efficiency empowered groups and 
government agencies that pushed for policies designed to reduce carbon emissions at the 
expense of groups and agencies pushing the interests of the oil, power, steel and cement 
industries. Both India and China countries have begun to take significant steps to address 
climate change, but contrary to what one might expect, it is authoritarian China and not 
democratic India that appears to be taking the strongest action to reduce climate change. I 
argue that China is facing less pressure from groups that favor conservative climate 
policies compared to India because of the intervention of the top party leadership.  
My case studies in India and China provide further confirmation of the results of 
the statistical model by tracing causal processes in the interactions between international 
and domestic politics. They demonstrate how participation in international institutions is 
influencing the strategies and positions of domestic actors on climate change. In addition, 
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they further illuminate the relationship between regime type and the strength of climate 
policy. As the case of India illustrates, democracies foster deliberations on climate 
change among different interest groups and allow them to compete for their favored 
climate policies. Climate policy is the result of a compromise between those favoring 
policies that alleviate climate change and those who oppose such policies. One of the 
lessons we can draw from the Chinese experience, on the other hand, is that regime type 
may be less important than regime legitimacy in shaping climate policy. It is the top 
leadership’s focus on strengthening the legitimacy of the regime that has given those 
actors advocating an ambitious climate policy the ability to prevail in the bureaucratic 
struggles over climate policy.  
 
Scholarship on Global Climate Politics  
Scholarship on global environmental politics has given much attention to climate 
change, seeking to understand states’ response to climate change and to engage them with 
climate mitigation and adaption (Betsill, 2010; Cass, 2006; D. Fisher, 2004; Harrison & 
Sundstrom, 2010; Keohane & Victor, 2011; Okereke, Bulkeley, & Schroeder, 2009; 
Purdon, 2015; Victor, 2006). Some scholars have analyzed obstacles and opportunities of 
international cooperation on climate change (Falkner, Stephan, & Vogler, 2010; Hovi, 
Sprinz, & Underdal, 2009; Keohane & Victor, 2011; Parker, Karlsson, Hjerpe, & Linnér, 
2012; Victor, 2006). Some has concerned with national government’s response to climate 
change by examining domestic institutions, interests and ideas (Bailey & Compston, 
2012; Cass, 2006; Hale, 2010; Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010; Hochstetler & Viola, 2012). 
Others have explored the participation of subnational governments in climate mitigation 
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with a range of climate initiatives (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005; Schreurs, 2010; Sugiyama 
& Takeuchi, 2008; Urpelainen, 2009). This study contributes to the existing literature by 
casting light on the question of the emergence of proactive climate policies in developing 
countries. It focuses in particular on how the interaction of international and domestic 
politics has shaped climate policies. By doing so, the study also adds to our 
understanding of when and how international relations and domestic politics matter in 
influencing a country’s environmental policy decisions.  
In addition, much of the literature on global climate politics has analyzed factors 
that shape developing countries’ international negotiating stance and domestic climate 
actions (Bailey & Compston, 2012; Chandler et al., 2002; Coetzee & Winkler, 2014; 
Dimitrov, 2010; Dolšak, 2009; Hallding et al., 2011; Najam, Huq, & Sokona, 2003; 
Never, 2015; Torney, 2015; Williams, 2005). Some has looked at the impact of 
international context and institutions (Coetzee & Winkler, 2014; Torney, 2015). Some 
has explored the impact of domestic factors, including economic development, energy 
structure and climate vulnerability (S. Fisher, 2012 ; Rong, 2010; Tyler, 2010; Viola & 
Franchini, 2012). Perhaps one important trend of this area has been a move to analyze the 
rise of emerging powers such as India, Brazil, China and South Africa in global climate 
governance, in particular their climate policy changes in international negotiations and 
domestic action (Bailey & Compston, 2012; Hallding et al., 2011; Hurrell & Sengupta, 
2012; Never, 2015; Torney, 2015). But much attention was given to the role of state, and 
less was paid to domestic non-state actors, and their interaction with state power and 
international institutions. This study extends existing literature in this direction by taking 
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a closer look at how a pro-climate domestic group shaped climate policies in India and 
China.  
 
Methodological Approach  
This study adopts a mixed-method approach, seeking to reveal the causal 
mechanisms by combining quantitative analysis with case studies (Gerring, 2007; 
Lieberman, 2005; Seawright & Gerring, 2008). Data analysis is useful to assess whether 
the possible explanatory variables are associated with the dependent variable. It provides 
a preliminary confirmation of some core hypotheses and dismisses several rival 
explanations. Case studies in individual countries are useful to identify why and how 
these explanatory variables are correlated with the dependent variable by investigating a 
narrowed ranged of hypotheses and tracing the causal process within countries (George & 
Bennett, 2005; King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994; Mahoney & Goertz, 2006). 
I used statistical analysis to examine general patterns in the strength of climate 
policy across developing countries. I gathered data on the effect of international 
institutions (i.e. international socialization and international financial support level), 
regime type, the influence of domestic interest groups (i.e. environmental NGOs and 
fossil fuel industries), economic development level and air quality level of a large sample 
of developing countries. The data analysis provides preliminary confirmation of the 
significant effect of international institutions and regime type on the strength of a 
country’s climate policy. But it is less useful to determine whether the effects of 
international institutions and regime types are causal or spurious, and to evaluate which 
mechanisms work and when they work.  
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I used case studies to understand how international institutions and regime type 
are correlated with the strength of climate policy. The case selections are based on two 
considerations. First, I chose one typical case that can exemplify the cross-national 
relationship. I selected an “on-the-line” case, India, to examine how the causal 
mechanism works in a general cross-case relationship. Second, I chose one deviant case 
to develop new explanations for the strength of climate policy. I selected an “off-the-line” 
case, China, to explore why an authoritarian developing country would have a more 
ambitious climate policy than what the statistical model predicts.  
The case studies draw on three principal sources of data. First, a number of 
secondary sources were examined, including journal articles and relevant books, research 
reports of NGOs and think tanks and newspaper articles. They cover the evolution of 
India and China’s participation in international climate negotiations, the domestic 
development of climate politics in India and China, and the involvement of major climate 
actors in the two countries.3 The secondary sources provide valuable support to my case 
studies with detailed account of climate policy evolution in China and India. Second, the 
case studies rely on an analysis of a wide range of primary sources. Government 
documents and speeches of government officials were collected and analyzed, covering 
India and China’s national communications with the UNFCCC, domestic Five-Year 
                                                
3 In the case study of India, it draws on information from India’s important policy journal Economic and 
Political Weekly, and influential environmental magazine Down To Earth. Four major English-language 
newspapers were analyzed in the case study, including the Hindu, the Indian Express, Times of India and 
Livemint. Research reports from leading non-government think tanks, such as The Energy and Resource 
Institute (TERI), Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) and Centre for Policy Research (CPR), were 
examined to corroborate the analysis of climate policy in India. With regards to the case study of China, it 
draws heavily on Chinese-language sources, including information from state-run media, Xinhua Net, 
People’s Daily and Guangming Daily, as well as Chinese journal articles at CNKI database. Research 
reports from government-backed research institutions were also incorporated to the case study, such as 
Energy and Research Institute (ERI), the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) and China’s National 
Climate Center. 
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Plans, national climate change action plans, and public speeches of their relevant climate 
policymakers.4 Third, the case studies draw on interviews conducted during fieldwork in 
Beijing in 2014. Interviews were conducted with governmental officials, climate experts, 
and representatives of environmental NGOs. The interviews serve to facilitate deeper 
understanding of climate politics in the off-the-line case, China. These different sources 
are triangulated in order to strengthen the data’s validity. 
 
The Outline of the Research 
My dissertation is organized in five chapters. Chapter 1 provides a brief overview 
of my research. Chapter 2 looks at possible explanations for the strength of climate policy 
and generates major hypotheses from different theoretical perspectives. Chapter 3 
presents the findings from data analysis. Due to data availability, I used a cross-sectional 
dataset to test correlations between independent and dependent variables. The results 
suggest that a developing country’s engagement with international institutions and its 
political system have significant effects on the strength of its climate policy. The 
statistical analysis provides preliminary confirmation of correlations, but less useful to 
identify when and how these explanatory variables affect the strength of climate policy. 
Hence, I selected two cases to trace causal mechanisms in the interactions of international 
domestic dynamics.  
                                                
4 The case of India looked at speeches of bureaucrats that have worked at Ministry of Environment and 
Forests (MoEF), Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), served as members of PM’s Council on Climate 
Change. The case of China focused on speeches of high-ranking party members and government officials 
from the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC).  
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The following two chapters focus on the qualitative case studies. Chapter 4 
features an “on-the-line” case: India, to examine how causal mechanisms work in a 
general cross-case relationship. I have found that India’s strong climate policy is due to 
the evolution of a pro-climate policy community as a result of interaction between 
international and domestic political dynamics. International institutions facilitated the 
emergence of this pro-climate group with roots in scientific and business groups through 
international socialization and economic incentives. However, national politics have 
divided this community regarding the extent of their commitment to climate mitigation. 
The gradual shift in climate policy illustrates the compromise between international 
pressure and domestic interests.  
Chapter 5 focuses on an “off-the-line” case: China, and seeks to explain why an 
authoritarian country would have a more ambitious climate policy than what the previous 
statistical model predicts. I have found that the emergence of China’s climate policy is 
also due to a strong pro-climate policy community, which developed because of 
international interaction and a shift in Chinese domestic politics. Specifically, 
international institutions helped cultivate a pro-climate policy community through 
international socialization and economic incentives. China’s domestic political dynamic, 
particularly the party-state leadership’s rising energy and environmental concerns, which 
strengthened the power of the pro-climate policy community. Due to the interplay of the 
international community and the development of domestic actors, the pro-climate policy 
group was able to advance their interests in climate policymaking process, and prompt 
China to adopt a proactive climate policy.  
 12 
My study is concluded with summarizing the main findings in both statistical 
analysis and case studies and discussing the implications of these results for climate 
politics in the developing world. I suggest that scholarship on climate politics would 
benefit by paying more attention to domestic interests and institutions and the state-
society dynamics.  
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CHAPTER II 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
My research seeks to understand why and how ambitious climate policies have 
adopted in some developing countries. Drawing on the existing literature, this chapter 
first examines the conceptual definitions of climate policies. Second, it discusses possible 
explanations for the strength of these climate policies and generates major hypotheses of 
the research.  
 
The Dependent Variable and Conceptual Definitions 
I measure cross-national variation of climate actions (my dependent variable) by 
the strength of developing countries’ climate policies. Climate policies include a series of 
laws, regulations and policy instruments that address climate change. Building on 
different scholars’ research works, the strength of climate policies in my study is assessed 
on two levels:  
• The international level: focusing on international commitments to UNFCCC, 
including the ratification and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, and the 
participation of the Copenhagen Accord.  
• The domestic level: focusing on the adoption of domestic policies by a 
national government to mitigate climate change, including a set of domestic 
regulations and measures listed in the IPCC report.  
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International Commitments  
At the international level, the strength of climate policies can be reflected in 
countries’ positions in international negotiations. In the case of developing countries, I 
measure their international commitments based on their participation in the Kyoto 
Protocol and the Copenhagen Accord. As the Kyoto Protocol is the first international 
binding agreement to cut greenhouse gas emissions, many studies take the ratification 
and the implementation of the Kyoto protocol as an important indicator of a country’s 
global commitments to climate change (Bernauer & Böhmelt, 2013; Burck, Bals, & 
Ackermann, 2009; Bättig & Bernauer, 2009; Dolšak, 2009; Harrison & Sundstrom, 
2007). For instance, one way to measure this is through: 1) the ratification of the 
UNFCCC and the speed with which a country did so; 2) the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol and how quickly each country did so; 3) the submission of the latest national 
climate report, as well as its timeliness; and 4) the frequency and punctuality of financial 
contributions to the UNFCCC secretariat (Bernauer & Böhmelt, 2013; Bättig & 
Bernauer, 2009). A similar way examines 1) how quickly each country ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol, and 2) whether it has developed an institutional capacity to participate in 
flexible mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol (i.e., a carbon trading scheme, the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implement (JI)) (EBRD, 2011). Yet another 
approach to measure a country’s international commitments is based on how politically 
challenging their commitments are (Dolšak, 2009; Harrison & Sundstrom, 2007). As 
Dolšak, Harrison and Sundstrom indicate, the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol would be 
less politically challenging than the implementation of mitigation projects, such as 
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hosting the CDM, as the latter requires domestic capacity building and public 
expenditures (Dolšak, 2009; Harrison & Sundstrom, 2007).  
However, as members of non-Annex I countries, developing countries have no 
mandatory emission targets and assume no obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. In other 
words, the political demands on them are smaller than those facing Annex I countries. 
Therefore, examining the Kyoto Protocol alone cannot explain how strong developing 
countries’ global commitments are. Therefore, my study also discusses the participation 
of developing countries in the Copenhagen Accord, as it signals that developing countries 
are taking significant steps on climate change with quantified targets for the first time in 
the history of international negotiations (Hallding et al., 2011; Hurrell & Sengupta, 
2012).  
 
Domestic Climate Progress  
While focusing on developing countries’ commitments to international 
negotiations can provide the most systematic information about actions on climate 
change, it cannot fully explain the strength of climate policies without consideration of 
domestic climate policies, as global interactions take place in the context of forces partly 
driven by domestic political decisions. In the following paragraph, I enumerate how to 
measure the domestic actions of a national government.  
At domestic level, my study focuses on national climate targets, regulations and 
instruments employed by different sectors that could contribute to greenhouse gas 
emissions. To make domestic climate actions comparable across countries, I follow most 
scholars’ research works on climate policy comparison, and have selected a manageable 
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set of policy instruments based on the list of the IPCC report (Compston & Bailey, 2013 ; 
Dolšak, 2009; EBRD, 2011; Harrison & Sundstrom, 2007; Kunkel, Jacob, & Busch, 
2006; Lachapelle & Paterson, 2013).5  
The strength of domestic climate policies first examines whether there are climate 
regulations and targets, such as a set of standards for emissions quotas and reduction in 
some sectors (Compston & Bailey, 2013 ; EBRD, 2011; Kunkel et al., 2006). For 
instance, Compston and Bailey (2013) in their analysis of the strength of climate policy, 
focuses on “a ban on fossil fuel power stations unless equipped with Carbon Capture and 
Storage (CCS), or emission standards that have the same effect, and emissions standards 
and/or fuel economy standards for motor cars” (Compston & Bailey, 2013 ). As a large 
proportion of greenhouse gas emissions are concentrated on energy and industry sectors, 
particularly in developing countries, my study focuses on climate regulations and targets 
adopted by national governments in these two areas.6   
Second, it discusses the adoption of market-based mechanisms across countries, 
including carbon-trading permits, carbon tax and feed-in tariff. As these mechanisms are 
widely employed by a growing number of countries, they become an important indicator 
to measure and compare the strength of domestic climate policies (Compston & Bailey, 
2013 ; Dolšak, 2009; Harrison & Sundstrom, 2007).  
Third, the strength of domestic policy is evaluated by governmental financial 
support for climate change, particularly public expenditure on research and development 
                                                
5 The IPCC report categorizes climate policy instruments into seven groups: 1) regulations and standards 
for emission levels; 2) taxes and charges; 3) tradable permits; 4) voluntary agreements; 5) subsidies and 
incentives; 6) research and development (R&D); and 7) information instruments (S. Gupta et al., 2007). 
6 Details regarding climate policy instruments across sectors can be found: 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_wg3_report_mitig
ation_of_climate_change.htm 
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(Kunkel et al., 2006; Lachapelle & Paterson, 2013). Due to the close relationship between 
energy consumption and climate change, here my study also focuses on subsidies for 
renewable energy development and deployment.  
In general, the strength of a developing country’s climate actions is compared on 
two levels. Investigating only one of them will not enable us to fully understand the 
strength of climate policy across countries. As noted earlier, the comparison of global 
commitments to climate change alone cannot fully capture the strength of climate policy 
in the developing world, because their commitments in the Kyoto Protocol do not come 
with large political costs, given that these countries assume no obligations. However, 
only looking at domestic policies adopted by the developing world cannot illustrate the 
strength of climate policies either, as the adoption of some policy instruments and 
institutional capacity building in developing countries is based on their communication 
with international climate change regimes.  
In addition, my study of the strength of climate actions focuses on policy outputs, 
such as the adoption of legislation, laws and policy instruments, rather than on policy 
outcomes, such as the change of emission level and emissions trend. First, policy 
outcomes alone cannot provide detailed accounts of the process and efforts made by 
national government on climate change. Also, it is not clear whether the outcome is 
policy-induced or just coincidental. Specific circumstances such as economic 
development, technological innovations and demographic factors, can affect the variation 
in emission trends and levels. For instance, part of the reduction in emissions in Germany 
was directly attributed to unification, while in the UK, the liberalization and privatization 
of the energy market were the primary causes, rather than being policy-driven 
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(Eichhammer et al., 2001; Hammons, 2006; A. Michaelowa, 2003). Also, as some 
climate policies and instruments have been implemented only recently, it will take 
several years for their effects to show up in emissions levels and trends.  
 
Hypotheses: Variables Influencing Climate Actions 
There is a considerable amount of work that addresses the question of why strong 
climate policies arise in some countries rather than others. Some focus on a cross-national 
comparison of countries’ overall actions on climate change, ranging from OECD 
members to emerging economies, and some focus on aggressive climate actions in a 
specific country (Bailey & Compston, 2012; Cass, 2006; Hallding et al., 2011; Harrison 
& Sundstrom, 2010; Hochstetler & Viola, 2012; Lachapelle & Paterson, 2013; Weidner 
& Mez, 2008). Drawing on these studies, my study examines three types of explanations, 
political, economic, and environmental, for understanding how these factors are shaping 
climate policy-making processes in developing countries.  
 
Political Explanations  
International Institutions 
The international institutions in which countries are nested largely shape their 
responses to international environmental issues, such as climate change. Through 
participation in international institutions, states are able to interact and address specific 
environmental issues while exchanging knowledge and ideas, sharing financial resource 
and building patterns of rules and principles (Finnemore, 1996; Jacobson, Reisinger, & 
Mathers, 1986; Keohane & Nye, 1987; Krasner, 1982; March & Olsen, 1998; Schreurs & 
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Economy, 1997; Young, 1994). Socialization in international institutions is changing 
states interests and behaviors in different ways. It shapes states’ perception of 
environmental problems by influencing domestic scientific discourse with the transfer of 
scientific knowledge, as new scientific information about causes and consequences of 
environmental issues emerged (Haas, 1992). International institutions also influence 
countries’ actions on environmental issues by changing the calculation of costs and 
benefits analyses with economic incentives and technical expertise (Brown Weiss & 
Jacobson, 2000). This effect is prominent in the case of developing countries, as they 
may have relatively weak scientific capacity and financial support for environmental 
research and protection. With an inflow of technology and financial resources, 
engagement with international institutions can enhance the willingness of developing 
countries to improve their environmental performance (Spilker, 2012). In addition, 
international institutions affect countries’ behaviors on environmental issues with the 
diffusion of internationally held environmental norms and principles, such as sustainable 
development, and thus encourage states to behave as a environmental-friendly citizen in 
the international community (Ward, 2006). The following section takes a closer look at 
how international institutions influence states on climate change through scientific 
knowledge, financial resources and environmental norms and principles.  
 
Scientific and Environmental Discourses 
International institutions are able to change a country’s national environmental 
policy through international socialization with scientific knowledge and environmental 
principles (Haas, 1992; Litfin, 1994; Mitchell, 2007; Young, 1994). Scientific findings 
 20 
and deliberation play a crucial role in addressing global environmental issues as they can 
reduce uncertainty by identifying causes and consequences of environmental problems. 
International institutions facilitate the spread of this scientific knowledge with efforts of 
epistemic communities, reframe scientific discourse about environmental issues and 
introduce environmental problems into policy debates (Grundmann, 2007; Haas, 1992; 
Jasanoff, 1998; Litfin, 1994; Meyer, Frank, Hironaka, Schofer, & Tuma, 1997; Paterson, 
1996; Peterson, 1992). One example of this is epistemic communities’ contribution to 
ozone layer protection. A growing shared understanding of the causal knowledge on the 
relationship between CFC emissions and ozone layer depletion has brought bureaucrats, 
environmentalists and scientists together, and enhances the salience of ozone depletion in 
policy agendas (Haas, 1992; Litfin, 1994). 
Likewise, in the case of climate change, countries that integrate into international 
institutions have received a large amount of scientific information about the causes and 
consequences of global warming, which in turn could influence their climate actions 
through epistemic communities. Over the last three decades, international organizations, 
such as the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nation 
Environmental Program (UNEP) have been involved in research projects on climate 
change, including a series of international scientific and political meetings on this subject 
(Paterson, 1996). They established the well-known scientific community for climate 
change, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988, which aims to 
review and evaluate published scientific literatures on climate change, and to disseminate 
scientific views of climate change (Grundmann, 2007). By 2014, it has published five 
scientific assessment reports on climate change, and built a strong scientific consensus on 
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human-induced climate change around the world (Grundmann, 2007; J. Gupta, 2010). 
Engaging with these organizations increases exposure to scientific knowledge and 
awareness of the impact of human-environment interaction. This can alter the perception 
and decisions of actors on the domestic landscape, including policymakers, scientists, 
journalists, environmental NGOs and other participants (Biermann, 2001; Economy, 
1997). In essence, under the international institutions, countries are able to access much 
information about climate change and increase their understanding of this environmental 
issue, which can shape their interests in climate change and lead them to pursue proactive 
climate policy.  
International institutions not only shape countries’ national climate policy through 
scientific knowledge, but also through institutionalized environmental norms and 
principles (Grundmann, 2007; Meyer et al., 1997; Pettenger, 2007). Within international 
institutions, a country’s attitudes and actions toward global warming could be affected 
through the process of social learning (Finnemore, 1996; Mitchell, 2007; Wendt, 1999; 
Young, 1994). Through socialization, countries are exposed to different environmental 
ideas and theories, and some of them may internalize these ideas and principled norms, 
and then change their environmental policies. In the last two decades, the international 
community has convened a number of conferences on environmental protection and set 
up a series of principles for countries to deal with climate change. One is the 
precautionary principle, which was promoted the UN Economic Commission for Europe 
(ECE) and the Second World Climate Conference Declarations(J. Gupta, 2010). It 
encourages countries to take proactive action on climate change in order to prevent future 
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regret regarding the negative impacts of climate change (J. Gupta, 2010). Most OECD 
countries value this principle and take it seriously.  
Another principle is the common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDRs), 
which was established under UNFCCC (J. Gupta, 2010). It implies that, while climate 
change is a common concern of mankind, responsibilities differs based on a country’s 
contribution to the problem and their capability to address it (Betsill, 2010; J. Gupta, 
1997). By this principle, the Global North should take more responsibility for climate 
change than the Global South. Industrialized countries not only need to take proactive 
actions on climate change, but also provide financial assistance for developing countries. 
This principle has been widely accepted by developing countries and helps them defend 
their position in climate negotiations (Najam, 2005a; Williams, 2005).  
With the change of the geopolitical and economic landscape, new principles are 
set up and disseminated in the socialization. A new principle that is guiding climate 
policy is the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) (Coetzee & Winkler, 
2014; J. Gupta, 2010). The idea of NAMAs is related to the concept of Sustainable 
Development Policy and Measures (SP-PAMs). It appeared for the first time in the Bali 
Action Plan, and it encourages developing countries to link sustainable development with 
climate change, to ensure that they can realize their development goals in a low carbon 
path (Coetzee & Winkler, 2014). Therefore, the extent to which a country internalizes 
these principled norms and scientific ideas determines the strength of its climate policies. 
• Hypothesis 1A: Among developing countries, more exposure to scientific 
knowledge and environmental principles under international regimes makes a 
country more likely to adopt a stronger climate policy. 
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Economic Incentives 
Aside from scientific knowledge, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol provide a set of flexible mechanisms 
to promote international cooperation and enhance state capacity building, such as carbon 
trading, joint implementation and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (Betsill, 2010). 
The experience of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is one 
example. It allows countries that are over their emission targets to purchase emission 
credits from other countries that have an excess (Clapp & Dauvergne, 2011). Another 
mechanism that provides large economic benefits for different countries is the CDM. It 
enables developed countries to make investments in projects in developing countries in 
order to obtain credits to meet the requirement for GHGs reduction, and it helps 
developing countries reduce emissions by providing advanced technology and improving 
energy efficiency (Dinar, Rahman, Larson, & Ambrosi, 2011; Fuhr & Lederer, 2009). 
This mechanism has been widely accepted by developing countries, some of which have 
obtained high economic benefits, such as China and India (Dubash, 2012; Schröder, 
2011 ). Additionally, there are a variety of environmental aid programs that are organized 
by different international regimes, which aim to help developing countries build the 
capacity to tackle climate change (Clapp & Dauvergne, 2011; Purdon, 2014). For 
instance, the World Bank, UNDP and UNEP jointly established the Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF) to provide funding to developing countries in 
environmental protection projects, such as global warming (Clapp & Dauvergne, 2011; J. 
Gupta, 1997; Keohane & Levy, 1996). With financial support, the recipient governments 
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are able to engage more in climate change than they were before. Another example of 
climate finance is the Clean Technology Fund. As the largest multilateral climate 
investment fund, it is organized by multiple development banks and the UNFCCC, and 
has directed billions of financial support to developing countries with climate change 
(Purdon, 2014). Against this background, my study predicts that international regimes 
can influence national climate policy with increased financial resources. The more 
engagement countries have in international institutions, the more countries are able to 
access to these resources, and the more likely they will be to reconsider the costs and 
benefits of their climate actions.  
• Hypothesis 1B: Among developing countries, more access to financial resources 
under international regimes makes a country more likely to adopt a stronger 
climate policy. 
 
Political System 
A country’s political system is another crucial influence on the strength of climate 
policies. An amount of literature has examined how a political system can shape national 
environmental policies, and explored the relationship between democracy and 
environmental degradation. Most of this literature finds that democracy has a positive 
effect on environmental protection, and democracies are more willing to provide public 
services to deal with environmental problems than non-democracies (Axelrod, 2004; 
Bueno De Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, & Smith, 1999; Bättig & Bernauer, 2009; 
Congleton, 1992; Q. Li & Reuveny, 2006; Neumayer, 2002; Olson, 1982; Payne, 1995).  
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This effect of political system on environmental policies is due to decision-
making procedures under different regimes. Democratic states make decisions based on 
the interests of the median voters, who also have the median income share and time 
horizon, yet authoritarian governments have greater income share from tax revenues and 
gratuities, as well as a shorter time horizon given the high possibility of regime overturn 
(Congleton, 1992). Thus, the increasing marginal costs of environmental protection can 
discourage authoritarian states to provide this public good. Likewise, democracies have a 
great “encompassing interest” than non-democracies to satisfy, so they need to make sure 
the distribution of national income can benefit the majority (McGuire & Olson, 1996; 
Olson, 1982). Even if authoritarian regimes can provide a certain level of public good for 
collecting more revenues in the future, they are facing less pressure for public good 
provision, such as environmental protection, due to smaller “encompassing interest” 
(McGuire & Olson, 1996; Olson, 1982). This viewpoint has been developed by Bueno de 
Mesquita, who argues that the winning coalitions are smaller than the selectorate in 
authoritarian states in contrast to they are in democracies, so political leaders are more 
likely to provide private good for a small elite groups rather than public good for ordinary 
citizens (Bueno De Mesquita et al., 1999). Another advantage democracies enjoy is the 
freedom of individual rights and the free information flow. It allows their citizens are 
better informed about environmental problems and free to express their concern and 
demand change (Payne, 1995). On balance, democracy is more likely to take care of 
environmental problems, such as climate change, than non-democracy, as it has a large 
size of winning coalition and allows for a high degree of information flow. In addition, 
empirical evidence also indicates that democracies can significantly decrease human-
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induced environmental degradation in carbon dioxide and nitrogen dioxide emissions, as 
well as be more willing to join and ratify international environmental agreements (Q. Li 
& Reuveny, 2006; Neumayer, 2002). 
In contrast to the argument that democracy is positively related to environmental 
quality and strict environmental policy, some scholars argue that authoritarian regime 
may become more capable of dealing with the complex political and environmental 
pressure (Beeson, 2010; Heilbroner, 1974). Authoritarian regimes may benefit the 
environment by limiting environmentally destructive behaviors with strict policies, as 
they don’t pay much attention to individual liberty (Heilbroner, 1974). This viewpoint is 
also resonates with the coercive regulations on individual rights proposed by Hardin in 
dealing with the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968). In addition, for countries with a 
tradition of strong state intervention, authoritarian regimes can be more efficient to deal 
with environmental problems (Beeson, 2010). Even so, however, authoritarian regimes 
remain less effective in produce policy outcomes than democratic regimes because the 
former lack public participation in the policy making process and policy implementation 
(Gilley, 2012).   
• Hypothesis 2: Among developing countries, democratic regime makes a country 
more likely to adopt a stronger climate policy.  
 
Domestic Interest Groups 
Domestic interest groups can exert an influence on environmental policy in favor 
of their concerns (DeSombre, 2000; Falkner, 2008; Hochstetler & Viola, 2012; Kelly, 
2010; Olson, 1965; Pulver, 2012; Stigler, 1971; Yandle & Buck, 2002). If countries are 
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abundant with fossil fuels, such as coal, oil and natural gas, they will be able to develop 
carbon-intensive industries and resources-exporting industries due to relatively cheap 
energy price. The adoption and implementation of climate policies in these countries will 
be costly due to obstacles from entrenched interest groups in fossil fuel sectors. As the 
costs of emissions reduction are concentrated on carbon-intensive industries, these 
industries will have a powerful incentive to join together to lobby the government for 
weak climate policies. Their influence will be increased if they have good access to 
policy makers (Ehrlich, 2007; Tsebelis, 2002). Thus, the development of climate policies 
in these countries may be slow and less ambitious. On the other hand, if countries have 
large geographic resources to develop renewable energies, such as hydroelectricity, 
biofuel, wind and solar power, they are likely to formulate relatively strong climate 
policies, especially if these countries enjoy a comparative edge in renewable energy 
technologies and products.  
Since environmental regulations will benefit some firms and industries but harm 
others, corporations that have a high stake will be actively involved in lobbying policy 
makers (Olson, 1965; Stigler, 1971). Regarding climate policy, there will be a 
competition of interest groups between the fossil fuel sector and the alternative energy 
sector. Progressive climate policies will harm emissions-intensive sectors and fossil fuel 
producers, but benefit low-carbon sectors and renewable energy producers. Thus, the two 
interest groups will lobby for opposite climate policies. For instance, in the case of the 
United States climate policy, the Global Climate Coalition, which consists of major oil 
producers and other firms, strongly opposed to the Kyoto Protocol, and attempted to 
undermine scientific findings of climate change (Falkner, 2008; Yandle & Buck, 2002).  
 28 
Similarly, interest groups also play an important role in formulating climate 
policy in New Zealand. Since a major source for carbon emissions is coming from the 
agriculture sector, the farmers’ lobby Federated Farmers sought legislation that will 
protect agriculture industries (Kelly, 2010). The influence of interest groups on climate 
policy can also be found in developing countries such as Brazil and India. Under the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), corporations that are working on emission 
reduction programs, such as energy efficiency or renewable energy generation, can 
increase their revenues from CDM credits, so they are highly supportive for progressive 
climate policy (Pulver, 2012; Viola & Franchini, 2012). Although interest groups 
compete for different climate policies, their influence on the policy agenda is based on 
how they can overcome the problem of collective action. Since costs of climate policy 
will be concentrated in energy/emission-intensive sectors, but benefits will be widely 
dispersed, the coalition within the fossil fuel sectors may have higher stakes than low-
carbon sectors, and push further for their preferred climate policy. 
Hypothesis 3: Among developing countries, the presence of a greater number of 
influential interest groups from emission-related sector makes a country less likely to 
adopt a stronger climate policy. 
 
Environmental NGOs 
A growing number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have begun to 
assume increasing responsibilities to deal with environmental problems within borders 
and across countries over the last two decades, ranging from ozone layer protection to 
climate change (Corell & Betsill, 2001; Doyle & Simpson, 2006; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; 
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Raustiala, 1997; Risse-Kappen, 1995; Rootes, Zito, & Barry, 2012; Saunders, 2008; 
Wapner, 1996). These active environmental groups connect through shared ideas, 
common discourse and the exchange of information and services, and have been trying to 
shape environmental policies with principled ideas and different political strategies (Keck 
& Sikkink, 1998; Raustiala, 1997). At the international level, their technical knowledge 
and influence on public opinion can increase their leverage in international environmental 
negotiations, such as the participation of NGOs in the UN Convention to combat 
desertification and the Kyoto Protocol (Corell & Betsill, 2001). At the domestic level, 
they can shape national environmental policies as well as public life (Raustiala, 1997; 
Wapner, 1996). Environmental NGOs can provide information about policy opinions and 
frame environmental issues due to the complexity and uncertainty of environmental 
problems, as well as monitor a government’s commitment and keep the public informed 
(Raustiala, 1997). In addition, they can increase public awareness and shape individual 
behaviors with economic, social and cultural practices (Wapner, 1996). For instance, in 
dealing with climate change, a coalition named Stop Climate Chaos, consisting of 
numerous environmental NGOs, has framed climate change issue as a global climate 
justice issue and highlighted the negative effect of climate change on poor countries, to 
call attention from the North (Saunders, 2008). While conventional literature has always 
linked NGOs to industrialized democracies, it is noteworthy that the presence and 
development of environmental NGOs have increased in developing countries under 
authoritarian regime, such as China, Iran and Burma (Doyle & Simpson, 2006; Schwartz, 
2004). While environmental NGOs choose not to challenge the state and avoid 
confrontational strategy, their development is tolerated and even encouraged by the state 
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in dealing with environmental issues. These groups have also started to exert influence on 
environmental policy and, by extension, climate policies in these countries. Overall, as 
mentioned, my study hypothesizes that countries with a large number of environmental 
NGOs are likely to be more active regarding their climate policies. 
• Hypothesis 4: Among developing countries, stronger environmental NGOs make a 
country more likely to adopt a stronger climate policy. 
 
Economic Explanations  
Whether countries can capture emissions mitigation opportunities depends on 
their economic growth. With economic development, countries are able to invest in 
advanced technologies that pollute less, while bearing relatively high mitigation costs. A 
number of studies have discussed the linkage between economic growth and 
environmental quality. Grossman and Krueger, among others, indicate that there is an 
invert U-shaped relation between environmental quality and per capita income, which is 
termed as the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) (Grossman & Krueger, 1994; Stern, 
2004; Torras & Boyce, 1998). They state that economic activities will inevitably cause 
environmental degradation, but the demand for improving environmental quality will 
increase with rising per capita income. This shift is due to strict environmental 
regulations, advanced technologies and the effect of industrial composition (Grossman & 
Krueger, 1994). Therefore, even if economic growth is associated initially with 
worsening environmental conditions, environmental quality will rise in the long term 
when a country’s per capital income reaches a critical level. Aside from this, these 
countries are also able to assume high costs to deal with environmental problems (Brown 
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Weiss & Jacobson, 2000; Sprinz & Vaahtoranta, 1994). By following this curve, 
countries tend to engage more with addressing environmental problems when there has 
been a rise in their economic development.  
In the case of developing countries, economic growth has always been regarded 
as a top priority and important for poverty alleviation. By the logic of the EKC, at an 
early stage of economic development, we should expect these countries to pay less 
attention to environmental quality. A number of case studies in developing countries, 
such as Thailand, Mexico and Indonesia, show that the environment always loses in the 
conflict between economic growth and environmental protection (Desai, 1998). With 
increasing per capita income, environmental protection is no longer a luxury good, and 
countries are able to actively engage more in environmental issues than they were before. 
An empirical analysis of environmental research and development in OECD countries 
indicates that public research and development expenditures on environmental problems 
are increasing with income (Komen, Gerking, & Folmer, 1997). Other research also 
shows that economic and financial development can decrease environmental degradation 
in emerging economies, such as the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) countries 
(Tamazian, Chousa, & Vadlamannati, 2009). Moreover, economic development will 
bring a change in industrial composition. Service sectors are replacing manufacturing 
sectors and produce less pollution with economic growth, which will do less harm to the 
environment (Torras & Boyce, 1998). Another change that comes with economic 
development is environmental awareness. People’s values and goals shift from 
prioritizing economic growth to the quality of life, and they become more concerned 
about environmental degradation (Inglehart, 1995).  
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However, the way to link economic development and environmental quality 
differs between developed countries and developing countries. With a worsening global 
environment, it has become difficult for developing countries to replicate the path of 
developed countries given the limitations of natural resources and rapidly increasing 
population (Castro, 1995). Additionally, as the exporting of pollution-intensive 
production becomes less likely for developing countries, they may not have the positive 
effect of industrial composition on their environmental quality (Cole & Neumayer, 2005). 
Accordingly, in order to maintain their economic growth, these countries are seeking a 
way for sustainable development. Against this background, environmental policies that 
can benefit the domestic economy are welcomed in developing countries. For example, 
developing countries that suffer from power shortages are willing to use policies that can 
improve energy efficiency and relieve the shortage of power in their economies. In 
addition, by adopting strict environmental policies, developing countries that have major 
markets in developed countries can avoid potential border tax adjustment or carbon tariff, 
so that their exporting products can stay in competitive prices (Hochstetler & Viola, 
2012; Z. Zhang, 2010). In a word, economic development plays an important role in 
promoting proactive environmental policies.  
• Hypothesis 5: Among developing countries, high economic development makes a 
country more likely to adopt a stronger climate policy. 
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Environmental Explanations 
Local Air Pollution 
A country’s response to climate change is dependent on its domestic air pollution 
(Dolšak, 2009). At first glance, people may argue that a country’s reaction to a specific 
global environmental problem is related to their domestic ecological vulnerability to this 
problem, as observed in areas of ozone layer protection and acid rain control (Barrett, 
2003; Sprinz & Vaahtoranta, 1994). Countries with a high likelihood of skin cancer tend 
to be more supportive of protection for the ozone layer than those with a low likelihood 
(Sprinz & Vaahtoranta, 1994). Also, countries that suffer the most from acid rain problem 
are even willing to reduce emissions unilaterally, such as Scandinavian countries, the 
Netherlands, Germany and Austria (Barrett, 2003). By this logic, we would expect that 
countries with a low sea level and high reliance on their agricultural sector are willing to 
engage more in climate action than countries that are not. However, unlike ozone layer 
and acid rain problems, there is little evident that climate vulnerability can affect national 
climate policy, even controlling for economic development (S. Dasgupta, Laplante, 
Meisner, Wheeler, & Jianping Yan, 2007; Rowlands, 1995; Tubi, Fischhendler, & 
Feitelson, 2012). However, as indicate below, some scholars point out that local air 
pollution can provide incentives for countries to make a proactive climate policy (Betsill, 
2001; Chandler et al., 2002; Dolšak, 2009; Sandler, 1997).  
While countries will suffer from sea level rise, water scarcity, agricultural output 
reduction and natural disasters in different ways and to a different extent, it is not easy for 
people to have direct experience with the consequences of climate change within a short 
period of time, this is particularly true with issues such as sea level rise and glacier 
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meltdown. It will take years for people to observe these long-term changes. However, 
unlike climate change, people can breathe and observe air quality in their daily life. For 
countries with severe air pollution, people are more concerned about air pollution than 
climate change. Interestingly, there are some common pollution sources for both air 
pollution and climate change, such as power production and transportation. It is likely to 
have synergies to link air pollution to climate change (Kok & De Coninck, 2005; Sandler, 
1997; Swart, Amann, Raes, & Tuinstra, 2004). Also, since the effect of climate policies 
takes a long time to become apparent, but the costs of them are concentrated in a short 
time, policy makers will favor profitable short-term concern rather than a long-term goal 
such as climate change (Hovi et al., 2009). By this logic, climate change can be reframed 
as a local air pollution issue that is already on a country’s local agenda, which can reduce 
obstacles to adopt a proactive climate policy (Betsill, 2001; Chandler et al., 2002). Thus, 
we should expect countries that encounter severe air pollution to obtain more private 
benefits by making stronger climate policies.  
• Hypothesis 6: Among developing countries, lower local air quality makes a 
country more likely to adopt a stronger climate policy. 
In conclusion, there are six major explanations for the strength of climate policy 
in developing countries. To test whether they can shape climate politics in the developing 
world, and when and how them can help use understand climate policymaking processes 
in these countries, the following chapters will use data analysis and case studies to 
examine these explanations in great detail.  
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CHAPTER III 
METHODS AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents the empirical analysis used to assess the dependent variable, 
the strength of climate policy. The study combines statistical analysis and detailed case 
studies to evaluate the hypotheses developed above. The goal of the quantitative analysis 
is to establish a correlation between explanatory variables and the dependent variable. 
The case studies investigate whether the statistical association is in fact causal, and 
provide a more nuanced look at why the explanatory variables are correlated with the 
dependent variable. By combining these cross-national quantitative and case study 
methodologies, the analysis seeks to better understand why some developing countries 
have taken more proactive climate policies than others.  
The first part of the chapter presents the main large N quantitative analysis. It 
analyzes a cross-sectional dataset that covers a large number of developing countries in 
2007. Due to limited data availability, the analysis begins with a multivariate OLS 
regression to test these hypotheses. After running a series of specification tests, it also 
examines the robustness of the findings by using alternative indicators for the 
independent variables and multiple data imputations for missing values (Honaker, King, 
& Blackwell, 2011). The results suggest that a developing country’s participation in 
international institutions and its regime type are significantly correlated with the strength 
of climate policy.  
The second part of the chapter explains the rationale behind case selection. It 
looks at one on-the-line case, India, to examine how international institutions and 
democratic system account for the strength of climate policy. It also selects one off-the-
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line case, China, to examine why an authoritarian country may adopt a more proactive 
climate policy then the statistical analysis would expect. Another consideration for India 
and China case studies is that both countries are significant and influential players in the 
global climate change discourse due to their large population, high carbon emissions and 
rapid industrialization.  
 
Empirical Analysis  
The goal of the statistical analysis in this section is to examine the correlations 
between the explanatory variables and dependent variable for evidence of possible causal 
relationship. It begins by analyzing key hypotheses with a basic bivariate regression. 
Next, I turn to a multivariate regression analysis to control for potential confounding 
factors and test the robustness of the results. In particular, I show that the conclusions of 
the simple analysis are robust after using alternative indicators for the explanatory 
variables and multiple data imputation for missing values. Data availability restricts the 
sample to 60 developing countries, which are categorized as such by the IMF’s World 
Economic Outlook Database.  
 
Variables  
As noted above, the motivation behind my study is to identify the driving forces 
for the variation in climate policies in the developing world. The dependent variable is 
the strength of climate policy, which is operationalized based on the CLIM Index 
(Climate Laws, Institutions and Measures Index). This index has the virtue of providing 
both international and domestic-level indices (EBRD, 2011). There are a number of 
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indicators to assess the strength of climate policies, but most of them focus on the climate 
change cooperation (Baettig, Brander, & Imboden, 2008; Bernauer & Böhmelt, 2013; 
Dolšak, 2009). Less attention is given to comparing domestic policies due to data 
availability.  
The index quantifies policy in four dimensions: international cooperation, 
domestic climate framework, sectorial measures or targets, and cross-sectorial fiscal or 
regulatory measures (EBRD, 2011). Every country receives a score in each of the four 
policy areas, which may take one of three values. That is, in each policy area p, every 
country c has a score 𝑆!" ∈    {0, 0.5, 1}. The index of climate policy is simply measured 
by the total value each country obtains. It ranges from 0 to 1, the higher the index is, and 
the stronger a country’s policy is.7 The index covers 95 countries that submitted their 
national communications to the UNFCCC between 1 January 2005 and 15 January 2011 
(EBRD, 2011; Steves & Teytelboym, 2013). As my study focuses on developing 
countries, the sample excludes all developed countries.  
The fist explanatory variable pertains to developing countries’ exposure to 
scientific information and their exposure to environmental norms transmitted via 
international institutions. Hypothesis 1A posits that among developing countries, more 
exposure to scientific knowledge and environmental principles under international 
institutions makes a country more likely to adopt a proactive climate policy. Following 
previous research, I employ membership in international organizations to measure a 
                                                
7 The international cooperation covers from Kyoto Protocol to ambitious targets for post-Kyoto period. The 
adoption of domestic policies covers domestic climate measures between 2008 and 2011 (Steves & 
Teytelboym, 2013). As developing countries have no mandatory emissions reduction target under the 
Kyoto Protocol, their international cooperation cannot truly reflect the strength of their climate policies. 
The study focuses more on national climate measures adopted after 2007. Therefore, data collection for all 
independent variables is from 2007.  
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country’s involvement in international institutions (Bernauer, Kalbhenn, Koubi, & 
Spilker, 2010; Spilker, 2012). Specifically, this study uses the number of international 
environmental treaties when a country is member as an indicator. The data are taken from 
Mitchell’s International Environmental Agreement Dataset Project (2002-2015, Version 
2007).8  
The second explanatory variable is a measure of developing countries’ access to 
economic incentives under international institutions. Hypothesis 1B indicates that among 
developing countries, more access to financial resource under international regimes 
makes a country more likely to adopt a stronger climate policy. The study focuses on 
climate finance these countries can obtain from international organizations. Because 
Global Environmental Facility (GEF) serves as the major financial mechanism of the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, the approved spending from GEF on global 
warming in a given developing country and year will be used as an indicator of economic 
incentives for developing countries.  
The third explanatory variable pertains to the political system in the developing 
countries. Hypothesis 2 posits that among developing countries, democratic regime 
makes a country more likely to adopt a stronger climate policy. To test this, I utilize the 
Freedom House political right index 2007.9 This index is a widely used indicator for 
democracy, and has a broad coverage (Bättig & Bernauer, 2009; Dolšak, 2009; 
Neumayer, 2002). The index ranges from 1 – most democratic – to 7 – most autocratic. I 
                                                
8 Data focuses on the number of environmental treaties that enter into force.  
9 Data retrieved from Freedom House.  
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have inverted the original data to create the variable political system so that a country is 
judged to more democratic the higher its score.  
Hypothesis 3 predicts that more influential interest groups from emission-related 
sector make a developing country less likely to adopt a proactive climate policy. To test 
the leverage of emissions-intensive interest groups, the study uses carbon emissions from 
fossil fuel per GDP available in data from the World Bank 2007, because country data on 
interest groups is sparse. To measure the effect of environmental NGOs (Hypothesis 4), 
my study follows Bernauer et al (2013), and takes the number of ENGOs membership in 
the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) as a proxy for ENGOs 
political leverage. 
To assess the effect of economic development (Hypothesis 5) on the strength of 
climate policy, this study uses the log of GDP per capita as an indicator. Though the 
square logged GDP per capita is often included for a non-linear effect between a 
country’s environmental performance and its national income, it is not included in the 
present study because the analysis is restricted to developing countries (Spilker, 2012). 
My expectation is that all developing countries stay in the left side of the inverted U 
curve in the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). GDP per capita data was obtained 
from the World Bank (2007).  
To account for the effect of local air quality in the strength of climate policy 
adopted by a developing country (Hypothesis 6), the study takes the log of sulfur dioxide 
emissions per capita as a proxy for air pollution. Sulfur dioxide emission is widely 
regarded as an important indicator for air quality in previous research (Bernauer et al., 
2010; Grossman & Krueger, 1994; Selden, Forrest, & Lockhart, 1999). Data are taken 
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from Emission Database for Global Atmosphere Research (EDGAR) (2007) because it 
has data up to the present. My hypotheses are summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1. The Operationalization and Data Sources for Independent Variables. 
Independent Variables Indicator Sources 𝐻!!: Exposure to scientific 
information and 
environmental norms 
 
The number of membership a 
developing country has in 
environmental treaties (choose the 
number of treaties that enter into 
force).  
International 
Environmental 
Agreement Dataset 
Project (2002-2015, 
version 2007) by 
Mitchell  𝐻!!: Access to economic 
incentives 
Whether countries are recipient of 
climate funds or not, 1 indicates 
yes, 0 indicates no.  
Website: Climate 
Fund Update 𝐻!: Political system Political rights index, scale of 
original data inverted, high values 
indicate more democracy 
Freedom of House 
2007 𝐻!: Emission-related 
interest group pressure 
The percentage of emissions-
related sectors’ contribution in 
GDP 
The World Bank: 
world development 
indicator 2007 𝐻!: ENGOs political 
leverage  
The number of ENGOS 
membership in IUCN per capita 
(Bernauer et al., 
2013) 𝐻!: Economic development Log of GDP per capita, since the 
data analysis is restricted in 
developing countries, the square 
term of loggdp per capita is not 
used here.  
The World Bank: 
world development 
indicator 2007 
𝐻!: Environmental quality  Log of sulfur dioxide emission per 
capita 
Emission Database 
for Global 
Atmosphere 
Research (EDGAR) 
2007 
 
Research Design 
This section presents my estimation strategy. My basic regression equation is for 
estimating the relationship between the dependent variable and explanatory variables in 
my study. Let 𝑆!" denote country c’s score in policy are p as quantified by the CLIM. 
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Recall that there are four policy areas and higher values of the index are indicative of 
more pro-climate policy.  𝑦 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐻! + 𝛽!𝐻! + 𝛽!𝐻!…+ 𝛽!𝐻! + 𝛽!𝐻! + 𝜀 
Before proceeding, three research design issues merit some discussion. The first 
design issue concerns the possibility of multicollinearity. This potential problem arises 
when two or more explanatory variables are highly correlated. To deal with the risk of 
multicollinearity, I used the variance inflation factor (VIF) diagnostic.10 The results show 
that all explanatory variables have high tolerance value to keep their independent effect 
on the dependent variable, indicating that they are not highly correlated.  
Second, consider the risk of heteroscedasticity. When the variance of the residuals 
is not constant, the standard errors of the estimated regression coefficients will be 
inefficient and biased. To test for this potential inferential threat I utilized the standard 
Breusch-Pagan test, results of which suggest heteroscedasticity is not a significant 
concern.  
 Third, the research design considers the possibility of endogeneity. One potential 
source of endogeneity arises from reverse causality. My empirical analysis treats all 
explanatory variables as exogenous variables, including international socialization (𝐻!!) 
and economic incentives (𝐻!!) under international institutions. One may argue that 
international socialization and economic incentives might affect the strength of a 
country’s climate policy, or that the strength of a developing country’s climate policy 
could also affect its dedication to international institutions and its ability to secure 
                                                
10 The average VIF is 1.56, so multicollinearity is not a concern. 
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financial support. To mitigate the potential risk of reverse causation, following previous 
studies, all independent variables have been lagged one year (Q. Li & Reuveny, 2006). 
The analysis begins with a simple bivariate regression, found in Table 2, to 
examine the first-order correlation between the dependent and explanatory variables. This 
first-cut indicates that most explanatory variables are highly correlated with the 
dependent variable. For instance, a developing country’s exposure to scientific 
information and environmental norms is positively correlated with the strength of its 
climate policy. As indicated in the table, a unit change in the membership can increase 
the strength of climate policy by 0.001.  
A similar relationship is also found in other explanatory variables, including 
developing countries’ access to economic incentives, their economic development, 
regime type and local air quality. One interesting finding is that GDP per capita is 
positively correlated with the strength of climate policy in the developing countries. This 
finding differs from the prediction of the Environmental Kuznets Curve, in which most 
developing countries should stay in the left side of the curve and favor economic growth 
over environmental protection.  
Table 2 also shows that two independent variables do not indicate statistically 
significant effect on the strength of climate policy. One is the political influence of 
interest group, and the other is the effect of ENGOs. These findings contradict with the 
literature on explaining domestic institutions for environmental policies. One likely 
reason for this result is that the indicators for both variables cannot fully capture the 
dynamics of domestic politics in these countries. Accordingly, the following multivariate 
analysis and case studies still take these two hypotheses into consideration.
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Table 2. Bivariate Correlation Coefficients. 
 Correlation coefficient  
Membership  .0012355 *** 
Climate fund  .0887861 ** 
Political system  .0375348 *** 
Interest group political leverage .0906332 
ENGO political leverage -.0097896 
Log GDP per cap .0507461 *** 
Air quality  .0474887 *** 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
 
Table 3. Multivariate Regression Analysis. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Membership 0.000670** 0.000657** 0.000677** 0.000586** 0.000631** 0.000899*** 
 (0.000292) (0.000289) (0.000265) (0.000279) (0.000262) (0.000243) 
Climate fund 0.0820** 0.0858** 0.0861** 0.0961*** 0.0986*** 0.0892*** 
 (0.0350) (0.0341) (0.0338) (0.0322) (0.0316) (0.0325) 
Political system 0.0287*** 0.0289*** 0.0289*** 0.0275*** 0.0271*** 0.0257*** 
 (0.00895) (0.00888) (0.00880) (0.00874) (0.00865) (0.00896) 
Log GDP per cap 0.0252 0.0241 0.0250* 0.0282* 0.0315**  
 (0.0161) (0.0159) (0.0149) (0.0152) (0.0136)  
Air quality -0.000148 0.00296  0.00735   
 (0.0168) (0.0158)  (0.0150)   
Interest group 0.0644 0.0601 0.0638    
 (0.0657) (0.0649) (0.0613)    
ENGOs -0.00366      
 (0.00660)      
Constant -0.289 -0.267 -0.294*** -0.242 -0.312*** -0.110** 
 (0.184) (0.178) (0.102) (0.176) (0.101) (0.0521) 
       
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60 
R-squared 0.511 0.508 0.508 0.500 0.498 0.449 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance indicated as follows:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
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Table 3 presents results for multivariate regression analyses between all 
explanatory variables and the dependent variable. The first model (m1) is the full model 
that includes all original potential explanatory variables. Another five models (m2-m6) 
have regression analysis by selecting different independent variables based on their 
statistical significance. Among the explanatory variables, three of them display 
significant effect on the strength of climate policies across all models, including 
membership, climate fund and political system, which indicates that one unit change of 
each variable can affect the strength of climate policies to different extents in terms of 
estimated coefficients of explanatory variables.  
First, the effect of a developing country’s membership in international 
environmental treaties is statistically significant and positive, reflecting that a developing 
country’s growing integration into international institutions could make the country more 
likely to have a strong climate policy. However, it is worth noting that the effect of 
membership is relatively small, as a unit change in the membership only increases the 
strength of climate policy by 0.00067. Second, the effect of climate fund from 
international institutions is also statistically significant and positive. As climate fund is a 
dummy variable in the analysis, the result suggests that a developing country with 
economic incentives from international institutions has stronger climate policy than one 
without economic incentives. Third, the effect of political system on the strength of 
climate policy is statistical significant and positive across all models, indicating that the 
more democratic a developing country is, the more likely the country will take strong 
climate policy.  
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Among the six models, it is worth noting that four explanatory variables do not 
indicate statistically significant correlation with the strength of climate policy, including 
economic development (Log gdp_pc), air quality (Log so2_pc), political leverage of 
energy-intensive industries (interest group) and environmental NGOs (ENGOs). Hence, it 
seems that these findings may not support my previous assumptions. However, the 
insignificant effects of these explanatory variables could result from the data quality and 
sample size. To fully understand the potential role these explanatory played in a 
developing country’s climate policy, case studies will take them into consideration. 
My findings are robust to alternative indicators for political system in the data 
analyses, particularly different measurements for democracy (Boix, Miller, & Rosato, 
2012; Cheibub, Gandhi, & Vreeland, 2010). The effect of political system on the strength 
of climate policy remains statistically significant and positive. In addition, since the 
model has a small data set with missing values, I used the multiple data imputations for 
missing values across all developing countries (Honaker et al., 2011; Imai, King, & Lau, 
2009). The results support previous data analyses, suggesting that the strength of climate 
policy is significantly affected by a developing country’s exposure to scientific 
information and environmental ideas, its access to climate finance and domestic political 
system.  
The preliminary data analysis helps to build general causal mechanisms between 
explanatory variables and dependent variable. It illustrates that both international 
institutions and domestic political system are correlated with the strength of a developing 
country’s climate policy. However, the statistical analysis cannot answer whether the 
correlations are causal, and explain when and how these explanatory variables are 
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correlated. Particularly, it cannot tell under what conditions and in what ways 
international institutions and political system have shaped the strength of climate policy. 
It also fails to capture the potential interaction of international and domestic dynamics.  
In addition, due to data availability, the data analysis cannot fully capture political 
dynamics in developing countries’ climate policy. First, the data sample is a cross-
sectional data instead of panel data, which makes it difficult to capture temporal 
dynamics across countries. Hence, the limitation of data collection reduces explanatory 
power of the statistical analysis. Second, the difficulties in measuring explanatory 
variables also make it hard to truly reflect the causal effect of explanatory variables on 
dependent variable. Particularly, in the statistical analysis, it is very difficult to measure 
the effect of political leverage of energy-intensive industries and environmental NGOs in 
developing countries because precise data is scarce. Measuring a developing country’s 
international socialization faces the same challenge. While I used the membership in 
environmental treaties as a proxy for international socialization, one could argue that 
international institutions can influence a country’s climate policy through multiple 
channels, and this proxy cannot distinguish the role of international socialization from 
other possible channels. Therefore, in light of limitation in the data quality and small 
sample, all results in the data analysis need to be interpreted with caution.  
 
Case Selection  
Further research on case studies is an essential part of my study. First, it helps to 
include some explanatory factors that are not included in the original hypotheses, as some 
countries might have specific settings that facilitate their climate actions. Second, case 
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studies allow us to capture some factors that are too difficult to be examined by a data 
analysis, such as the contextual factor.  
I selected cases based on the outcomes of statistical studies and on the 
significance of specific countries in climate change mitigation. As the preliminary data 
analysis suggests, the following three factors from political explanations have a 
statistically significant effect on the strength of climate policies adopted by developing 
countries: 1) a developing country’s exposure to scientific information and environmental 
ideas in international institutions (Hypothesis 1A); 2) a developing country’s access to 
economic incentives from international institutions (Hypothesis 1B); and 3) the political 
system of a developing country (Hypothesis 2). To explore linkages between 
international actors and different domestic groups and to capture the nuances and better 
understand causal mechanisms, my study selected the following two cases.  
In order to examine how the causal mechanisms work in a general cross-cases 
relationship, I selected one typical case that is on the regression line (Seawright & 
Gerring, 2008). Figure 1 shows that the fitted line with predicted values from regression 
analysis and data observations with actual values of the dependent variable. In this figure, 
most data observations are clustered around the regression line. Among them, one 
observation (IND, which refers to India) is right on the line, which also indicates that it 
has the smallest residual between its actual value and the predicted value from the 
regression model. Therefore, I selected India as a representative case.  
My study will also consider “off-the-line” cases, which are not well explained by 
the regression model. Focusing on these cases can help us to examine some independent 
variables that are not considered in the regression model due to lack of theory or data 
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(Lieberman, 2005). Among the “off-the-line” cases in the model, my study will 
investigate the case of China. First, China is a “substantively important” case in that it 
has special normative interest due to its major role in domestic and international politics 
(Mahoney & Goertz, 2006). As an emerging power among developing countries and the 
largest greenhouse gases emitter in the world, China’s participation in combating climate 
change will have a crucial impact on climate stabilization (Parker et al., 2012; Saul & 
Seidel, 2011). Second, studying China in particular is theoretically important as it 
remains an authoritarian regime with a high degree of political centralization and a 
traditional top-down policy making process; investigating the dynamics of its domestic 
politics can provide another perspective to understand policy formulation in non-
democratic countries.  
Figure 2: Case selection.  
 
Moreover, taking India and China as case studies offers several advantages for 
analyzing the interaction between international and domestic actors in the evolution of 
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climate policies in the developing world. In the face of global environmental problems 
such as climate change, China and India share many common features, which are 
expected to lead them to a similar level in the strength of climate policies. In the arena of 
international climate negotiations, both countries have taken similar positions to defend 
developing countries’ right to develop, and both reject quantitative mandatory emission 
cuts targets. As large carbon emitters, both are under growing pressure on climate 
mitigation. Meanwhile, both countries have drawn a number of financial resources for 
their carbon emission and clean energy programs due to host CDM projects under the 
Kyoto Protocol (Fuhr & Lederer, 2009). In the arena of domestic policy debates, India 
and China face a set of similar economic and environmental constraints in addressing 
climate change. As two of the fastest growing economies and the most populous 
countries, both countries take economic development and poverty alleviation as top 
priorities. Also, both have suffered from worsening air pollution in recent years. 
Therefore, climate change is neither a policy priority nor has high public support. Against 
this background, we should expect India and China to pursue similar climate actions. 
However, statistical analysis based on the aforementioned hypotheses predicts India’s 
performance, but not China. Taking intensive investigations on these two countries 
enables us to explore factors that cannot be reflected in the model. One of these factors is 
the interaction between international and domestic actors. By tracing the process of how a 
global environmental problem is interpreted and structured by the dynamics of domestic 
politics in each country, case studies will provide another angle to examine the 
relationship between my independent variables and dependent variable. Another 
advantage for investigating these two cases is to seek possible factors that may have been 
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missed in previous theoretical setting but may have a decisive influence on the strength of 
climate policy in India and China.   
As this chapter indicates, in the study to address the strength of climate policies 
across developing countries, data analysis is useful in examining the effects of both 
international institutions and domestic politics. However, it is difficult to explore the 
interplay between international actors and different domestic groups and to capture 
efforts made by local actors to put climate change on the policy agenda. To capture the 
nuances and better understand causal mechanisms, cases in chapter 4 and chapter 5 will 
be examined by using a) interviews with governmental officials, climate experts, 
representatives from environmental NGOs and business groups, and b) materials 
collected from government documents, research reports and public speeches by senior 
officials.  
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CHAPTER IV 
CLIMATE POLITICS IN INDIA 
As previous data analysis has indicated, a developing country’s participation in 
international institutions and its regime type significantly affect on the strength of its 
climate policy. To further understand when and how the international institutions and 
regime type shaped a developing country’s climate policy, this chapter focuses on an “on-
the-line” case, India, and explores how the interaction between international and 
domestic actors have shaped the emergence of proactive climate policy in India.11 In 
particular, it examines how India’s integration into international environmental 
governance has facilitated the rise of a pro-climate policy community through 
international socialization and economic incentives. This pro-climate community 
includes societal groups from the bureaucracy as well as the scientific and business 
communities. It then explores how economic opportunities and changes in domestic 
energy governance and climate bureaucracy prompted these groups to advance their 
interests in climate change and push the Indian government for a proactive climate 
mitigation policy.  
The evolution of India’s climate policy also offers an interesting case in which to 
examine climate politics in the developing world. At first glance, India is an unlikely 
place to see proactive climate action. India has a fast-growing economy, and it is facing 
pressing challenges such as poverty alleviation and energy access. In 2004, 38.4% of 
                                                
11 Pervious data analysis has predicted India’s climate actions, given that the observation of India is right on 
the regression line. 
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India’s population still lived less than $1.90 a day.12 The number dropped to 31.4% in 
2009, but this percentage still accounts for a large proportion of the population.13 
Additionally, India was still ranked 134th on the Human Development Index in 2009,14 
which suggests that India’s overriding concern is and should be human and economic 
development. Aside from poverty alleviation, another challenge facing the Indian 
government is rural electrification. By the mid-2000s, India still had 78 million 
households with no access to electricity (Dubash & Bradley, 2005, p. 73). This has 
limited poverty reduction given the important role of electricity in accessing better 
economic opportunities, health care and education in rural areas. Against this background, 
poverty mitigation and economic development still dominate the domestic policy agenda 
and are viewed as the priorities for the Indian government.  
Upon closer examination, India has become an active player on climate change 
since the late-2000s. It softened its stance on climate change in the international climate 
negotiations and developed a series of domestic climate actions (Atteridge, Shrivastava, 
Pahuja, & Upadhyay, 2012; Dubash, 2009b; K. Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2011; 
Rastogi, 2011; Thaker & Leiserowitz, 2014). This chapter seeks to explain why such a 
strong climate policy has emerged in India.  
The first section of this chapter will present an overview of the evolution of 
India’s climate policy, including changes in India’s international negotiations and 
domestic climate actions. The next two sections will take a closer look at the impacts of 
                                                
12 Data is from the World Bank: http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/IND (Accessed by 
02/04/2016). 
13 Ibid.  
14 Data is from the UNDP.  
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international institutions and domestic politics on the transformation of India’s climate 
policy through the development of a pro-climate policy community. Specifically, it 
examines how India’s participation in international environmental governance led to the 
emergence of a pro-climate policy community through international socialization and 
economic incentives. It then explores how domestic changes in energy governance and 
climate bureaucracy encouraged this community to advance their interests in climate 
mitigation. As the interplay of international institutions domestic politics, a pro-climate 
policy community was able to prompt India to take a proactive climate policy.  
 
Shift in India’s climate policy 
India has undergone a transformation over the last two decades, gradually 
evolving from a strong opponent to a relatively active proponent of climate policies. 
Table 4 illustrates the development of India’s climate policy. At international climate 
negotiations, India has departed from its traditional position as a southern hardliner that 
were at the front against climate change since the late-2000s (Dubash, 2009b; Rajamani, 
2009; Vihma, 2011). At the domestic level, India has adopted a set of climate measures 
across different sectors, as well as at different levels of governments. This section 
examines the evolution of India’s climate policy in greater detail. 
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Table 4. Timeline of India’s climate policy.  
International 
Commitment  
No 
Internation
al 
obligation  
No 
quantifie
d target 
No 
quantified 
target 
No quantified 
target 
No 
quantified 
target;  
 
Soften 
rhetoric on 
per-capita 
emissions 
No 
quantified 
target 
Yes 
Voluntary 
quantified 
target 
pledged:  
20-25% 
cut 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
 
INDC 
target  
33-35% cut 
by 2030 
below 2005  
Domestic 
Action 
No climate 
policies  
No 
climate 
policies  
Energy 
saving and 
conservation  
Integrated 
Energy Policy 
adopted;  
 
National 
Environmental 
Policy adopted 
 PM's 
council on 
climate 
change 
established;  
 
Energy 
Intensity 
reduction 
target 
launched  
India’s 
National 
Action 
Plan on 
Climate 
Change 
released 
State 
Action on 
Climate 
Change 
(SPACC) 
developed 
 
 Renewable 
Energy 
Certificate 
(REC) 
trading 
system 
commenced  
Perform 
Achieve 
and 
Trade 
(PAT) 
Scheme 
started 
 Smart 
cities 
program 
launched 
Renewable 
energy 
target 
enhanced 
Time  1991-1995 1996-
2000 
2001-2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
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Changes in International Stance 
At the international level, after being a long-time opponent of strong climate 
action between the early 1990s and the mid-2000s, India has emerged to be an active 
player in the international climate negotiations in recent years.  
From the 1990s to the mid-2000s, India had been strongly against making any 
international commitment to limit its GHGs emission, and insisted that developed 
countries should take major responsibility for climate change due to concerns of burden-
sharing equity and economic development (Atteridge et al., 2012; Dubash, 2013; Vihma, 
2011). For example, in a paper prepared for the New Delhi Conference of Select 
Developing Countries on Global Environmental Issues in 1990, the Indian government 
emphasized that “it is the developed countries which have created and continue to add the 
threats of climate change and it is primarily their responsibility to reverse the situation by 
setting limits on their emissions of greenhouse gases” (Rajan, 1997, p. 103). The Indian 
government also indicated that “developing countries would accept particular responses 
only if they do not impede their economic development or reduce the resources currently 
available for such development” (Rajan, 1997, p. 104). Additionally, the government 
showed little interest in climate change given its low per-capita emission. In the early 
1990s, India emitted only 2-4% of the world total GHGs emission (Jacobsen, 1998, p. 4). 
If the emissions are measured on a per-capita basis, India’s per-capita emission in 1993 
were five times below the world average at the time (Jacobsen, 1998, p. 4). One of 
India’s influential environmental think thanks, the Centre for Science and Environment 
(CSE), stated that it was not fair to equate the luxury consumption of the rich with the 
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survival emissions of the poor, and suggested a “per-capita entitlement” position for the 
Indian government.15 Then-Indian chief negotiator Chandrashekhar Dasgupta even 
presented the CSE’s original case of the “per capita” argument and took it as India’s 
formal position in the climate negotiations of in the early 1990s (Stevenson, 2011, p. 
1012). Therefore, in India’s national report for United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED), the Indian government “listed population, 
poverty, agriculture and community waste as highly priorities, but climate change and 
sea-level rise were hardly considered” (Jacobsen, 1998, p. 7). During negotiations in the 
1990s, the government also stressed that India’s development tasks cannot be 
compromised by climate actions, and that emissions will grow to meet its social and 
development needs (Jacobsen, 1998, p. 8).  
The Indian government maintained this negotiating stance for a long time. During 
the 1997 Kyoto climate meeting, Minister of Environment and Forest (MoEF) Saifuddin 
Soz argued that “India categorically rejects ideas suggesting any new commitments for 
developing countries…India’s first and overriding priority is poverty eradication and 
provision of basic human needs. The Convention acknowledges that the share of global 
emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and 
development needs”.16 In 2002, India hosted the Eighth Session of the Conference of 
Parties (COP-8) to the UNFCCC in New Delhi, in which all parties adopted the Delhi 
                                                
15 See Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain, Global Warming in An Unequal World (Center For Science And 
Environment, 1991). The great influence of this report on shaping the Indian government’s position in the 
early climate negotiations can be seen in a set of scholars research (Isaksen & Stokke, 2014; Never, 2012).  
16 Soz, Saifuddin. India Rejects Incorporation Of New Environmental Commitments for Developing 
Countries. (Text of speech presented at the COP-3 to the UNFCCC at Kyoto, 1997). 
http://www.m2.com/m2/web/story.php/1997852568440080DDE88025683A0025702A (Accessed by 
07/08/2015). 
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Declaration on Climate Change and Sustainable Development. During the session, India 
reaffirmed its stance that development and poverty alleviation are priorities for 
developing countries (Government of India, 2004, p. 162). India’s firm stance on climate 
change can also be found in its government documents. As the 2006 National 
Environmental Policy showed the essential elements of India’s response to climate 
change have been “adherence to the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities”, “equal per-capita entitlements of global environmental resources to all 
countries” and “over-riding priority of the right to development” (Government of India, 
2006b, p. 43). 
However, India began to change its position at international forums from the 2007 
onwards (Atteridge et al., 2012; Dubash, 2013; K. Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2012; 
Thaker & Leiserowitz, 2014; Vihma, 2011). Between 2007 and 2010, India began to 
soften its rhetoric in international climate negotiations. At a G8+5 Summit in 
Heiligendamm in 2007, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh pledged that India’s per capita 
emissions would never exceed those of the developed world (Government of India, 2014). 
This pledge was reiterated by the Prime Minister in his address on the release of the 
Indian national climate change program in 2008 (Government of India, 2008b). The 
announcement signaled a change of India’s climate policy, introducing of the notion of 
caps for the first time (Atteridge et al., 2012, p. 70). In 2009, before the Copenhagen 
climate talk, India pledged a voluntary carbon intensity reduction plan, and aimed to 
reduce the emissions intensity of its GDP by 20-25% by 2020. Like China, for the first 
time in the history of the climate negotiations, India proposed a quantified emissions 
reduction target (Hurrell & Sengupta, 2012, p. 471). In 2010, at the COP-16 Cancun 
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climate talk, Minister of the MoEF Jariam Ramesh went a step on climate policy, and 
stated that “all nations must take on binding commitment in an appropriate legal form” 
(Ramesh, 2014). In 2015, in its submitted report to the UNFCCC regarding the Intended 
Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC), India included a target to reduce the 
emissions intensity of its GDP from 2005 levels by 33% to 35% by 2030 (Government of 
India, 2015, p. 34). 
 
Changes in Domestic Climate Action  
The transformation of climate governance also took place at the domestic level 
from the 2007 onwards, with Indian government adopting a proactive climate policy at 
national and subnational levels (Dubash & Jogesh, 2014; Fujiwara, 2010; Mathur & 
Varughese, 2009; K. Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2011; Rastogi, 2011).  
As discussed earlier, throughout the 1990s, India was strongly against making a 
commitment to climate change mitigation in international negotiations. The government 
instead focused on how to avoid such obligations while also obtaining financial support 
from developed countries (Rajan, 1997, p. 150). Meanwhile, it did not provide sufficient 
financial support to control growing emissions (Jacobsen, 1998, p. 13). There were few 
policies and measures that directly addressed climate change at the time (Jacobsen, 1998). 
India’s 8th Five-Year Plan (FYP: 1992-1997) emphasized that “it is essential that these 
negotiations recognize the aspirations of large masses of poor people and do not impose 
any burden on developing countries, respecting their sovereign right over their resources. 
Transfer of technology, flow of new and additional resources to developing countries to 
fully meet any additional cost are pre-requisites to international cooperation in the 
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environment sector” (Government of India, 1992, p. 4.16.17). The 9th Five-Year Plan 
(FYP: 1997-2002) also indicated that “global environmental issues, such as ozone 
depletion, climate change due to accumulation of GHGs, bio-diversity loss etc. are 
largely due to the rapid industrialization of the developed nations. India is an insignificant 
contributor to the GHG emissions” (Government of India, 1997, p. 8.2). While India’s 
10th FYP plan (2002-2007) started to mention the implications of climate change 
nationally, it asked for further research instead of actions (Government of India, 2002b, p. 
221). Although India tried to keep its domestic climate actions consistent with 
international negotiations, the 10th FYP showed that “developing countries are not 
required to take any commitment during this phase, however, under the Protocol all 
countries have to reduce emission of GHGs by making mitigation efforts like improving 
efficiency of energy conversion and utilization, afforestation, stabilizing population 
growth, limiting methane emissions through proper waste management and phasing out 
subsidies on power utilization” (Government of India, 2002a, p. 1076). 
While few climate-oriented actions were adopted in India between the 1990s and 
early 2000s, India has begun to initiate policies that target carbon emissions. As indicated 
in India’s Integrated Energy Policy 2006 and its first National Environmental Policy of 
2006, India’s sustainable development plans, ranging from renewable energy 
advancement to energy efficiency enhancement will lead to GHG emissions reduction 
(Government of India, 2006a, p. 135, 2006b, p. 42). In 2007, the Prime Minister (PM) 
instituted a Council on Climate Change (PMCCC), which is a special office with a high-
level advisory group on climate change within the Prime Minister’s Office. It is designed 
to advise the government on mitigating climate change and to coordinate national actions 
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(The Hindu, 2007). India’s 11th FYP (2007-2012) also detailed domestic climate actions 
“to reduce the energy intensity per unit of GHG by 20% from the period 2007-08 to 
2016-17” (Government of India, 2007b, p. 207). In early 2008, the PM’s office set up a 
Special Envoy on Climate Change to better engage in both international negotiations and 
domestic planning. During the same year, the PMCCC released the National Action Plan 
on Climate Change (NAPCC), which outlines eight national missions for combating 
climate change, ranging from renewable energy development to water mission and 
sustainable habitats protection (Dubash & Joseph, 2015, p. 15). In 2009, the Indian 
government also requested all states to develop a State Action on Climate Change 
(SPACC) under the framework of the NAPCC (The DNA, 2009). These SPACCs were 
expected to develop specific and necessary institutional and policy infrastructures to 
support the implementation of climate actions (TERI, 2011, p. 5). By 2013, 22 states and 
Union Territories had completed drafts of their SPACCs, nine of which had been 
approved by the MoEF (Dubash & Jogesh, 2014, p. 1). Additionally, in 2010, an Expert 
Group on Low Carbon Strategies for Inclusive Growth was set up to support the 
formulation of India’s 12th Five Year Plan (FYP: 2012-2017), and to analyze sectoral 
mitigation opportunities and develop low-carbon strategies (Shakti, 2015, p. 1). In 2015, 
India also created a new plan for renewable energy that pledged to increase the share of 
non-fossil fuels to 40% in the total energy consumption by 2030 (The Hindu, 2015). 
In addition to policy support for climate mitigation, the central government has 
begun to offer financial support to deal with climate change. First, India increased 
investment in renewable energy, particularly after 2009. By 2011, India had become the 
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second-largest country in renewable energy investment among developing countries.17 In 
November 2010, India initiated a market-based mechanism to encourage the use of 
renewable energy, the Renewable Energy Certificate (REC) trading system (EDF, 2015, 
p. 4). This market mechanism aims to promote power companies to increase renewable 
sources in their power generations by setting up specific targets (EDF, 2015, p. 4). 
Additionally, in 2010, the government launched another market-based mechanism 
targeting energy efficiency enhancement, the Perform Achieve and Trade (PAT) 
initiative, which is a cap-and-trade scheme for energy efficiency (EDF, 2015, p. 2). The 
system resembles the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), but it employs a cap on energy 
intensity rather than on absolute carbon emissions. It sets mandatory energy efficiency 
targets on 473 facilities from energy-intensive industries and the electricity sector, which 
accounted for 60% of India’s 2007 GHG emissions (EDF, 2015, p. 2).  
As discussed above, India’s climate policy has undergone an important evolution 
since 2007. On the international front, India has played a more constructive role in 
international climate negotiations. It relaxed its attitude towards climate action in 2007 
and proposed a voluntary quantified emissions target in 2009. Domestically, India has 
formulated proactive climate measures to improve energy efficiency and the development 
of renewable energy, such as the creation of the two market-based mechanisms, the PAT 
and the REC in 2010, and a new renewable energy advancement plan in 2015. These 
changes are in contrast with the initial inaction and rejection to climate mitigation 
schemes between the 1990s and early 2000s. This chapter seeks to answer why and how a 
                                                
17 Data from Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2013. India’s renewable energy investment 
faltered between 2012 and 2013, but started to rise in 2014. According to the same report in 2015, it was 
the third-largest country in renewable energy investment among developing countries. 
 62 
developing country such as India, which has an unfinished development agenda, low-
capita carbon emissions and a strong concern for equitable burden sharing, has adopted a 
proactive climate policy. Below, I argue that the transformation is due to the evolution of 
a pro-climate policy community as a result of interaction between international and 
domestic political dynamics. International institutions facilitated the emergence of this 
pro-climate group with roots in scientific and business groups through international 
socialization and economic incentives. However, national politics have divided this 
community regarding the extent of their commitment to climate mitigation. The gradual 
shift in policy illustrates the compromise between international pressure and domestic 
interests.  
The Impact of International Dynamic 
 This section explores the impact of India’s participation in global environmental 
governance on domestic actors’ attitudes towards climate change. Specifically, it 
examines how the international institutions helped to create a pro-climate community 
with international socialization and economic incentives. This community comprises 
climate experts, private entrepreneurs and government bureaucrats. Between the late 
1990s and mid-2000s, India’s growing political and economic integration globally 
created an atmosphere in which domestic actors could exchange scientific knowledge and 
ideas about the environment. The increased access to information particularly shaped 
climate experts’ perception of climate change and its implications for India. In addition, 
economic incentives created an opportunity for stimulus and growth in the business 
sector. By cultivating a group of pro-active climate actors, international institutions have 
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played an important and constructive role in shaping the transition of India’s climate 
policy from 2007 until the present day.  
 
Scientific and Environmental Discourses 
Between the late 1990s and mid-2000s, India’s growing participation in the 
international institutions has influenced the salience of climate change in the domestic 
policy agenda. In particular, the interaction of international environmental research 
institutions and India’s scientific and bureaucratic communities has promoted the 
emergence of pro-climate advocates within the two communities, which has brought the 
scientific perspective on the implications of climate change for India into the climate 
policy debate.  
While India has engaged in discussion of climate change internationally since the 
early 1990s, both the government and the scientific community remained skeptical of 
global scientific assessments on climate change due to their limited involvement in the 
international scientific research (Biermann, 2002; Kandlikar & Sagar, 1999; Siebenhüner, 
2003). This distrust was evident in the assessment reports from the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The first chairman of the IPCC, Bert Bolin had pointed 
out that “many countries, especially developing countries, simply do not trust 
assessments in which their scientists and policymakers have not participated” 
(Siebenhüner, 2003, p. 113). Therefore, throughout the 1990s, the IPCC had been 
criticized for skewed reports with insufficient information and communication by 
developing countries such as India. Even if this organization is the foremost scientific 
authority on climate change with broad research and assessment capabilities on climate 
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change and detailed information on causes and consequences of climate change. Some 
Indian experts viewed the IPCC as a “political-scientific institution with little 
transparency and inherent Northern intellectual supremacy” (Biermann, 2001, p. 299). 
They also argued that the IPCC did not take developing countries’ interests into sufficient 
consideration, including a lack of concern for monsoon variability and equitable sharing 
for climate change (Biermann, 2001, pp. 300-301).  
Against this background, beginning in the later 1990s, the IPCC has made efforts 
to increase the participation of researchers and analysts from the developing world so as 
to facilitate the interaction of experts and knowledge transfer. This interaction helped the 
IPCC place more emphasis on issues that concerns developing countries, such as the 
socio-economic effects of climate change and a climate vulnerability assessment, and 
also stimulated India’s scientific capacity on climate change research (Biermann, 2001). 
In addition, between the late 1990s and the mid-2000s, there was growing scientific 
collaboration between the international institutions and India’s environmental and 
scientific communities on the implications of climate change for India (K. Michaelowa & 
Michaelowa, 2011; Never, 2012; Rajamani, 2009; Sathaye, Shukla, & Ravindranath, 
2006). One notable example of international cooperation is India’s first national 
communication report for the UNFCCC in 2004, which was based on a collaborative 
effort between India’s scientific community and the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) 
(Sathaye et al., 2006, p. 323). It involved a number of domestic research teams and 
educational institutions for research in climate modeling, climate impacts and mitigation 
(Sathaye et al., 2006, p. 323). During this time period, the election of Rajendra K. 
Pachauri as the head of the IPCC in 2002 also facilitated interaction between 
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international institutions and India’s scientific community to some extent (K. 
Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2011, pp. 7-8). One of India’s leading scientists, Pachauri, 
also served as the director of the Energy and Resource Institute (TERI: its former body is 
Tata Energy Research Institute), an influential research institution for India’s climate and 
energy issues and active participant in national policy making (Jacobsen, 1998, p. 18). 
TERI has a close relationship with the government, particularly because many climate 
experts and bureaucrats have worked previously at the TERI (Never, 2012, p. 380). This 
link between international institutions and domestic scientific and bureaucratic 
communities could also increase scientific information exchange on climate change and 
allowed it to gain more attention at home.  
From the mid-2000s, increased interaction with international institutions has 
promoted climate change on the domestic policy agenda and cultivated a group of pro-
climate actors in the scientific and environmental communities, especially after the IPCC 
released its fourth assessment report and won a Nobel Prize for its work on climate 
change in 2007. This group has called for proactive climate actions from the Government 
of India (Bharadwaj, 2007; Dubash, 2007; Mehra, 2007; Rajamani, 2007). Interviews by 
Isaksen and Stokke (2014) showed that “increased knowledge and awareness about 
India’s vulnerability has been an important driver for India’s climate policy… the IPCC, 
its chairman [Rajendra K. Pachauri] and other Indian climate researchers acted as 
knowledge brokers that brought attention to climate change impacts in India” (Isaksen & 
Stokke, 2014, p. 114). For instance, one climate expert, referring to the Stern Review and 
the fourth IPCC report, argued that India’s focus on the rhetoric of equity in climate 
change negotiation “is legitimate but not sagacious” due to adverse effects of climate 
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change on India’s economy, and the lack of domestic action would undermine 
international efforts to combat climate change (Rajamani, 2007, pp. 1-3). Another climate 
policy expert from an environmental nongovernmental organization, the Center for Social 
Market, stated that “India may not be the biggest global emitter, but it is time we were 
pro-active in addressing its impacts on our people”, given that India’s has a large 
population depending on climate-sensitive sectors (Mehra, 2007, p. 11).  
One of the most prestigious and influential policy journals in India, Economic and 
Political Weekly (EPW), also published a number of articles featuring climate change in 
2007 than it was before. An editorial in the EPW about the IPCC’s fourth report indicated 
that “the planet earth has reached an ecological turning point, and we need to think and 
act radically if we are to survive” (Editorial, 2007, p. 900). Climate expert, Nagraj Adve, 
whose article “Implication of Climate Panel Report” featured in the EPW, pointed out 
that “there is no doubt that the first world and capitalism are primarily responsible for the 
plight we are in… but given the little time to act and given that all scientific studies 
indicate that South Asian and Indian water sources, forests, biodiversity, shorelines and 
agriculture are already getting hit and going to get worse hit, the Indian government 
needs to move fast” (Adve, 2007, p. 1002).  
Anshu Bharadwaj, the director of the Center for Study of Science, Technology 
and Policy, also published his article “Carbon Counting” in the EPW, regarded the fourth 
IPCC report as “a stern warning”, indicated that “India may reject proposals for 
mandatory cuts in carbon dioxide emissions, but it has to consider meeting a reasonable 
proportion of its growing energy supply from carbon-free technologies” (Bharadwaj, 
2007, p. 13). Discussing India’s negotiation position in the 2007 Bali climate meeting 
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after the release of the IPCC report, climate policy scholar Navroz Dubash argued that 
“India needs to now ask itself if it should hold on to a defensive national stance on 
climate or if the time is right to develop and implement creative national policies...India 
has sought to occupy the moral high ground on climate change. But in a warming world, 
simply occupying the moral high ground will provide us little defense against climate 
devastation” (Dubash, 2007, p. 37). The impact of substantive scientific knowledge of the 
fourth IPCC report not only reaches out to the Indian scientists, but also bureaucrats. As 
noted by Rajamani (2009), in his address to the Indian Science Congress in January 2007, 
the Prime Minister said that “the science of climate change is still nascent and somewhat 
uncertain” (Government of India, 2007c). However, in his 2008 address, he 
acknowledged that “the recent global concern about climate change and global warming 
is in fact based on painstaking statistical work” (Government of India, 2008c). 
By fostering interaction between international institutions and India’s domestic 
scientific and bureaucratic communities, the credibility and legitimacy of global 
environmental assessments on climate change have increased since the mid-2000s. The 
diffusion of scientific knowledge and the building of national scientific capacity have 
facilitated the emergence of advocates who are conscious of the negative effects of 
climate change on India and the urgency needed in addressing it.  
 
Economic Incentives 
Between the late 1990s and the early 2000s, international institutions have also 
facilitated the emergence of pro-climate actors with roots in the business community 
through economic incentives, especially the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). As 
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a market-based mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM is designed to encourage 
developed countries to make investment in climate mitigation projects in developing 
countries, while also potentially providing access to advanced technologies. Since the 
2000s, the CDM has gained considerable interests from India’s industrial sector due to 
the interaction of the international community and India’s climate research and business 
groups (Bhushan, 2009; Parikh & Parikh, 2004; Shukla, Balasubramaniam, & Yajnik, 
2004).  
During India’s early participation in international climate negotiations in the 
1990s, its industries showed little interests in climate change due to scientific 
uncertainties and business competitiveness risks (Das, 2012; Jacobsen, 1998; Never, 
2012; Pulver, 2012; Rajamani, 2009). At that time, they were neither invited to the 
discussion of India’s negotiating stance nor involved in the views exchange with the 
major government institution for climate change, the Ministry of Environment and 
Forests (MoEF) (Jacobsen, 1998, p. 29). Also, the Indian industry doubted the scientific 
certainty of climate change, and regarded it as a kind of non-tariff restrictions used by 
developed countries to impede India’s economic growth (Das, 2012, p. 247).  
However, starting in the early 2000s, India’s exposure to information about the 
CDM and other profitable opportunities began to draw the attention of India’s business 
sector, which became enthusiastic about this and more interested in climate mitigation 
(Das, 2012; Deodhar, Michaelowa, & Krey, 2003; Pulver, 2012; Stevenson, 2011). There 
were different international organizations that involved in India’s CDM capacity building 
programs, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Asia 
Development Bank (ADB) and the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ, now GIZ) 
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(Phillips & Newell, 2013, p. 656). One example of the interaction between India’s 
industries and international institutions is the Indo-US Dialogue regarding the CDM 
between 1999 and 2000 (Stevenson, 2011, p. 1016). This dialogue was due in part to 
efforts of two U.S. climate policy officials, Kathleen McGinty and Karl Hausker, who 
had been visiting TERI as senior fellows at that time (Stevenson, 2011, p. 1016). It 
brought business leaders from the U.S. and India together to discuss opportunities 
presented by the CDM. They also held ministerial meeting to talk about “working closely 
together with other countries to develop… international rules and procedures for the 
Kyoto mechanisms, including the CDM” (Stevenson, 2011, p. 1016). This kind of 
interaction has promoted the awareness of the CDM among India’s industries. Later, 
between 2001 and 2002, when the Netherland government initiated a program, the 
Certified Emission Reduction Unit Procurement Tender (CERUPT), to buy Certified 
Emission Reduction Units (CERs) generated by CDM projects, the Indian project 
developers quickly seized the opportunity with “the entrepreneurial spirit of the Indian 
industry” (Rajamani, 2009, p. 349). These private entrepreneurs began to seek advice 
from research institutions such as TERI on CDM project proposals and approval from the 
MoEF to participate in the Dutch and Finnish carbon tenders in the early 2000s (Deodhar 
et al., 2003, p. 6; TERI, 2005, p. 3). 
Additionally, some large business associations, such as the Confederation of 
Indian Industry (CII) and the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industries 
(FICCI), being aware of economic opportunities beyond the CDM, also began to promote 
an consensus climate change mechanisms within the Indian industry (TERI, 2001, p. 6). 
The CII even developed a detailed handbook aimed at raising awareness of the CDM-
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related investment opportunities for its members (Pulver, 2012, p. 259). Attracted by 
additional investments from the CDM, the Indian industry pressured the government to 
set up authorities and regulations to manage CDM projects development (K. Michaelowa 
& Michaelowa, 2011, p. 7). By late 2005, India had surpassed Brazil to become the 
largest CDM projects holder (Pulver, 2012, p. 256). The business group also became 
more involved with India’s climate negotiations. The FICCI sent its first delegation to the 
2004 climate talk, and the CII became a registered participant observer in the climate 
negotiations after 2005 (Pulver, 2012, p. 259). Since the mid-2000s, the business sector’s 
increased interests in market-based mechanisms aimed at economic support for climate 
change mitigation have prompted more attention on the domestic political agenda.  
 
International Pressure  
As a participant in international institutions, India is not only exposed to scientific 
knowledge and economic incentives, but also to growing pressure from the international 
community, particularly from other developing countries (Atteridge et al., 2012; Hallding 
et al., 2011; K. Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2011; Rastogi, 2011; Vihma, 2011). This 
pressure has rose with India’s growing economy and international aspirations in the mid-
2000s.  
While India was continuously under international pressure for its stance on 
climate change throughout the 1990s, it was able to resist this influence with other 
developing countries by defending its right to develop. However, after rapid economic 
development began in the early 2000s, India has found it more difficult to use “the right 
to develop” as a defense for climate inaction. This is particularly true when it pursues a 
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leadership position in the international community, such as its bid for permanent 
membership in the UN Security Council since the mid-2000s (Atteridge et al., 2012; 
Hallding et al., 2011; Rastogi, 2011). As some Indian scholars have pointed out, the 
country’s aspiration to be seen as an emerging great power means that it also needs to 
take a leadership role in important global issues, such as climate change (Kapur, Khosla, 
& Mehta, 2009, p. 34). 
During the 2007 Bali climate meeting, India refused to commit any further action 
on climate change without imposing more ambitious targets on developed countries. This 
attitude created an image of India as being “obdurate” and gained bad reputation on 
tackling climate change (The Economist, 2008). This perception of India made India 
puzzled and disappointed (Dubash, 2009a; Mathur & Varughese, 2009). In a speech 
regarding India’s challenges in climate change negotiations, Shyam Saran, a senior 
climate negotiator and who was later appointed as Special Envoy of climate change in 
2009, said that “I found a deliberate and systematic diplomatic offensive to put India on 
the defensive, characterize it as a naysayer, as the Economist once said, acquire the 
reputation of being obstinate and recalcitrant” (Saran, 2010). He acknowledged that “it is 
also important to appreciate that in branding India as ‘obdurate’ or as a naysayer, there 
was also psychological pressure being brought upon us” (Saran, 2010). Aside from this, 
India’s traditional defensive approach to climate change faced criticism from other 
developing countries, such as Granada, Bangladesh and the Maldives (Thaker & 
Leiserowitz, 2014, p. 112; Vihma, 2011, p. 84). In his explanation of the shift of India’s 
negotiating stance in 2009, the Minister of the MoEF, Jairam Ramesh, indicated that 
India’s traditional stance was “disfavored by the developed countries, small island states 
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and vulnerable countries. It takes away from India’s aspiration for permanent 
membership of the Security Council” (Times of India, 2009a). 
India was also facing pressure from another large emitter in the developing world, 
China. As India’s rival for international status, China’s performance on climate change 
also had an impact on India’s climate policy making (Hallding et al., 2011, p. 63). In 
contrast to being portrayed as “obdurate”, China was “praised as flexible and forward-
looking” by the international community following the Bali 2007 meeting (Walsh, 2009). 
This pressure might partially explain why India released its first climate action program 
in 2008, which “in its form and structure, showed considerable similarity to the Chinese 
plan, which had been released a year earlier”, as noted by Dubash and Joseph’s research 
(Dubash & Joseph, 2015, p. 13). The government of India also used this domestic climate 
plan to signal that India was a “global citizen” that wanted to take further action on 
climate change (Livemint, 2007). The pressure from China became prominent after India 
and China signed an agreement on climate change cooperation in 2009 (Government of 
India, 2009). By aligning with China, India tried to safeguard its interests in climate 
negotiations, so as to resist the pressure from the international community on committing 
to legally binding emissions cuts. However, China’s increasing proactive climate action, 
coupled with President Obama’s pledge for emissions cut has put unexpected pressure on 
India prior to the 2009 Copenhagen climate meeting (Lakshimi, 2009). R.K Pachauri, a 
top Indian climate scientist as well as the ex-chairman of IPCC, pointed out that “India 
was at the crossroads after the recent U.S. and Chinese move” (Lakshimi, 2009). Thus, in 
late 2009, India followed China’s example in announcing its voluntary carbon intensity 
target at the Copenhagen meeting. The Minister of MoEF, Jairam Ramesh, indicated that 
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India’s pledge was stimulated by international pressure, and its specific form and 
contents were influenced in particular by China (Dubash & Joseph, 2015, p. 14). 
As noted above, between the late 1990s and the mid-2000s, India’s growing 
integration into the international institutions facilitated the rise of pro-climate actors with 
roots in scientific, business and political communities, which began to advance climate 
change mitigation in the domestic political agenda. Through international socialization 
with India’s climate experts regarding the scientific knowledge of climate change, 
international institutions helped to raise awareness of India’s vulnerability to climate 
change in both the government bureaucracy and civil society, which began to pay 
attention to the negative effects of climate change. Additionally, through economic 
incentives, international institutions promoted the participation of the Indian industrial 
sector on climate change, and stimulated their interest in climate mitigation. Growing 
international pressure also played an important role in the adoption of a proactive climate 
policy by cultivating pro-climate actors in the bureaucracy, within which some 
bureaucrats saw a link between India’s international aspiration and proactive climate 
actions.  
The Impact of Domestic Dynamic 
The transformation of Indian climate policy is due to a strong climate-oriented 
policy community created from the interaction of international and domestic dynamics. 
The previous section examined the impact of international institutions on India’s climate 
policy shift. This section focuses on how domestic political dynamics have shaped 
India’s climate politics by expanding the pro-climate policy group since the mid-2000s. 
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Specifically, it examines changes in energy governance and climate bureaucracy and their 
effects on India’s climate policy.  
 
Change in Energy Governance  
Between the early 2000s and mid-2000s, India’s energy governance went through 
a major shift. Due to insufficient supply and limited access, the focus moved from 
conventional energies to clean energies. This change provided an opportunity for the pro-
climate policy community to advance their own interests in domestic climate policy 
debates. Specifically, this change enabled a broad coalition with pro-clean energy 
government institutions and renewable energy sectors to be built. This was accomplished, 
in part, by linking climate change to energy security.  
Since the early 2000s, there had been a widening gap between energy supply and 
energy demand due to India’s higher economic development. Benefiting from economic 
liberalization in the early 1990s, India’s economy grew rapidly in the 2000s. From the 9th 
Five-Year Plan (FYP) period (1997-2002) to the 10th FYP (2002-2007), the average of 
India’s economic growth rate increased from 5.35% to 9.15% (Balachandra, 
Ravindranath, & Ravindranath, 2010, p. 6432). This higher economic growth drove a 
rapid increase in energy consumption. Starting in the early-2000s, the widening gap 
between energy supply and demand led to a severe energy shortage. Between 2003 and 
2004, India suffered an estimated shortage of 7.1% in energy terms and 11.2 % in terms 
of peak demand, and the number goes up to 10% and 17% respectively between 2007 and 
2008 (TERI, 2009, p. 5). According to the Indian government’s integrated energy policy 
report, if India wants to keep its economic growth rate of 8% over the next 20 years, it 
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will need to increase its primary energy supply by three to four times its 2003-04 levels 
(Government of India, 2006a, p. xiii). India’s heavy reliance on fossil fuel imports 
exacerbates the insufficient supply. India’s primary energy sources, coal and oil, which 
accounts for two thirds of India’s total energy consumption, are overwhelmingly 
dependent on imports.18 This leaves India vulnerable to the fluctuation of energy prices 
on the international market, as well as to domestic social instability (Varigonda, 2013, p. 
1113). In addition, the insufficient energy supply has been exacerbated by the increased 
political and economic risks of conventional energy access, which have suffered setbacks 
domestically and internationally since the early 2000s. While India has abundant coal 
reserves, its current coal production not only fails to keep pace with coal consumption, 
but also faces debates on banning coal mining in forest areas (Noronha, 2009; Sant & 
Gambhir, 2012). The Indian government also has realized that its assumption about 
India’s access to primary energy sources such as coal has been over-optimistic, as the 
estimates of 200 years of domestic coal reserves now might run out in around 45 years 
(Dubash, 2011, p. 71). Aside from this, India’s oil imports are also facing competition 
from other emerging economies, such as China, in the global market. This has increased 
India’s concerns regarding the limitations of conventional energies (Noronha, 2009; 
Rastogi, 2011). 
Acknowledging the constraints of conventional energies development on 
economic growth and energy security, the Indian government has become more interested 
in renewable energy development (Chaudhary, Krishna, & Sagar, 2015; Dubash, 2011; 
Sant & Gambhir, 2012). Between the early 2000s and mid-2000s, India developed a set 
                                                
18 Data is from the EIA. 
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of energy policies to further renewable energy development, particularly in wind and 
solar power sectors. In 2003, the Indian government enacted the Electricity Act of 2003, 
which provided a new institutional and legal framework for electricity generation and 
distribution, including promoting the generation of electricity from renewable energy 
(Chaudhary, Narain, Krishna, & Sagar, 2014; Dubash, 2011; Fujiwara, 2010). Following 
this was the passing of the National Electricity Policy 2005 and the National Tariff Policy 
2006, which require all state-level energy regulatory commissions to set up the share of 
electricity generated from renewable energy and a minimum percentage for power 
purchase from renewable sources (Chaudhary et al., 2015, p. 65). For instance, 
Karnataka’s Energy Commission set up a minimum of 5% and a maximum of 10% of 
electricity from renewables, and Madhya Pradesh’s Energy Commission stipulated 0.5% 
of electricity from wind power by 2007 (Lewis, 2007, pp. 217-218). In addition, the 
government launched a rural electrification scheme, Rajeev Gandhi Grameen 
Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY) in 2005, under which solar energy was regarded as an 
off-grid solution for electrification in remote regions (Harish & Raghavan, 2011). With 
policy support, wind and solar power sectors have started to flourish since the mid-2000s. 
Between 2003 and 2008, India’s wind power industry developed rapidly, with an average 
growth rate of 35%, which generated a number of wind power firms (Chaudhary et al., 
2015, p. 66). The most influential one, Suzlon, has become a leading wind turbine 
manufacturing firm both internationally and domestically with 8% market share in the 
global market and 52% of India’s market by 2006 (Lewis, 2007, p. 219). Aside from this, 
the government’s rural electrification also created space for solar power development. 
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Some Indian firms such as Moser Baer and Tata BP Solar started to develop 
manufacturing plants in India (Chaudhary et al., 2015, p. 72). 
Since the mid-2000s, India’s burgeoning renewable energy sectors, coupled with 
growing international concern on climate change, have created a new narrative that 
suggest linking energy security to climate change has emerged in India since the mid-
2000s (Dubash, 2011; Mehra, 2008). India’s 2006 Integrated Energy Policy report 
indicated that “for us the imperative is to push energy efficiency, promote modern 
renewables, develop new technologies that augment our energy supply such as in-situ 
coal gasification that also provide scope for carbon capture, and emphasize nuclear power. 
All of these will automatically help reduce the GHG emissions” (Government of India, 
2006a, p. 136). In 2007, the MoEF released a report titled “Addressing energy security 
and climate change”. It emphasized the significance of energy supply and access in 
India’s national development strategy, and identified clean energy access and energy 
efficiency enhancement as ways to build energy security and cut carbon emissions 
(Government of India, 2007a, p. xiii). Therefore, it is not surprising that India’s 2008 
national climate action plan, the NAPCC, focused on renewable energy policies that also 
mitigate carbon emissions. One example is the Solar Mission that outlined in the NAPCC. 
This plan aimed to deploy 20,000 MW of solar power by 2022. To achieve this target, it 
required further development of solar technology, as well as the capacity of grid-
connected solar power and off-grid solar applications (Government of India, 2008a). The 
growing connection between energy policies and climate change policy during the 
transition of India’s energy governance also brought the MoEF and the Ministry of New 
and Renewable Energy (MNRE) together for climate mitigation (Chaudhary et al., 2014).  
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This nexus of climate change and energy security had growing support from other 
senior climate policymakers after 2007. In his speech at Asia Society in 2008, The 
Minster of External Affairs, Pranab Mukherjee, highlighted the close linkage between 
climate change and energy security and the challenges both pose to India (Mukherjee, 
2008). Additionally, in his 2009 speech titled with India’s climate change initiatives, the 
Special Envoy on Climate Change, Shyam Saran, indicated that “for India, the climate 
change argument and the energy security argument have come together in compelling 
fashion…India must overcome the energy constraints on its growth and must do so in a 
global environment of increasing finite and depleting source of energy” (Saran, 2009). He 
also called for a shift in strategy from reliance on fossil fuels to a pattern of growth based 
on clean energy to deal with India’s energy security as well as climate change. During 
this shift to further renewable energy development, India is preparing itself for stable 
economic development with sufficient and safer energy supply and proactive climate 
actions.  
 
Change in Climate Change Bureaucracy  
The shift in India’s climate policy not only benefits from the change in India’s 
energy governance, but also from a transformation within India’s bureaucracy on climate 
change between 2007 and 2009. A change in staff on India’s climate policy institutions 
provided an opportunity for the pro-climate actors to advance their interests on the 
domestic policy agenda, and enabled them to have a greater say in India’s climate 
policymaking process (Never, 2012; Vihma, 2011). 
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Over the last two decades, India’s climate policy has been dominated by senior 
bureaucrats who favored a traditional defensive approach towards climate change, such 
as Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, Prodipto Ghosh and Shyam Saran (Dubash, 2009b; Never, 
2012; Vihma, 2011). Due to concerns for India’s unfinished development plans and the 
need for emissions space, these senior bureaucrats have been hesitant to promote strong 
climate policy. Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, then-chief climate negotiator from the MEA, 
emphasized the equitable burden sharing for climate change in terms of per-capita in the 
climate negotiations in the 1990s (Stevenson, 2011). While he was retired from the MEA 
in 2000, he was still an influential figure in India’s climate policy given his continued 
participation in the Indian delegation until 2009 (Vihma, 2011, p. 81). Another veteran 
climate negotiator, Prodipto Ghosh, who joined India’s delegation in 2001 as a top 
bureaucrat from the MoEF, had also been cautious about an ambitious climate policy, 
fearing that climate change would limit India’s development space (Vihma, 2011, p. 81). 
As he emphasized, “India’s concerns about economic growth and poverty eradication are 
legitimate and must be fully respected in any global climate regime” (Ghosh, 2009, p. 35). 
Starting with the appointment of Jairam Ramesh as the Minster in mid-2009, the 
MoEF under Ramesh has been pushing for ambitious climate policy domestically and 
internationally (Atteridge et al., 2012; K. Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2011; Never, 
2012). The takeover of Ramesh and his new team of young advisers in the climate policy 
process broke “the longstanding influence of several bureaucrats and advisers who stood 
for India’s old, reactive position in the international negotiations and a preference for 
growth over environment in all cases” (Never, 2015, p. 96). During Ramesh’s tenure as 
the Minister of the MoEF between 2009 and 2011, India initiated a number of domestic 
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climate measures, such as developing State Action Plans on Climate Change (SAPCC) to 
promote state-level climate action, and building the Indian Institutions on Climate 
Change Assessment with climate scientists to further India’s climate research (Dubash & 
Joseph, 2015). Ramesh also sought to reframe India’s stance in the international climate 
negotiations. In Ramesh’s leaked letter to the Prime Minister before the Copenhagen 
climate meeting in 2009, he argues that “India need to be seen as a deal-breaker and 
should try to curb emissions in its own interests”, in addition, he suggested that India 
should “not stick with G77 but be embedded in G20. We should be pragmatic and 
constructive, not argumentative and polemical” (Times of India, 2009a). As explained by 
Ramesh, he sought to “drive the domestic agenda and use that agenda for building a 
leadership position internationally” (Dubash & Joseph, 2015, p. 13). Meanwhile, the 
MoEF also consolidated its power in the climate policy process under the leadership of 
Ramesh (Dubash & Joseph, 2015). Its powerful position led to the disbanding of the 
Prime Minister’s Special Envoy on Climate Change, a climate coordination organization 
led by a senior conservative climate bureaucrat, Shyam Saran (The Hindu, 2010). 
While Ramesh’s bold statements on international negotiations were under harsh 
criticism from domestic actors in both the bureaucracy and civil society, his ambitious 
domestic climate measures faced little opposition as both sides share concerns on India’s 
energy problems and unfinished development tasks. For instance, after the release of the 
leaked letter Ramesh sent to the PM in 2009, senior climate negotiators such as 
Chandrasekhar Dasgupta and Prodipto Ghosh, had even threatened to pull out of the 
Copenhagen talks as they feared that the shift of India’s position on climate change 
would put constrains on economic growth (Times of India, 2009b). This concern was also 
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shared by the business community. President of the Federation of Indian Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry (FICCI), Harsh Pati Singhania, who wrote to the PM and 
emphasized that "per capita emissions should remain the basis for greenhouse gas 
emissions reduction, as reiterated by you at the inauguration of the Delhi High Level 
Conference on Climate Change Technology Development and Transfer" (Times of India, 
2009b). In addition, a number of environmental NGOs petitioned the Prime Minister that 
India’s climate policy must take India’s development into consideration and that the 
government not commit to any mandatory emissions cuts without financial and 
technological support from developed countries (Livemint, 2009).  
In response to the criticism, Ramesh made a speech in the Parliament right before 
the 2009 Copenhagen climate meeting. He argued that, “I separate domestic 
responsibility from international obligation. I want to be aggressive on domestic 
obligation and I want to be pro-active on international obligation because in international 
obligation there is only one thing that counts…it is India’s interest that counts”.19 While 
Ramesh’s progressive approach to international negotiations faced large opposition, his 
ambitious plan for domestic climate actions gained support from the conservatives. The 
senior climate negotiator Chandrasekhar Dasgupta, who initially expressed his opposition 
to Jairam Ramesh’s approach to international climate negotiations in 2009, also agreed 
on the importance of domestic climate actions. In his interview with the Indian Foreign 
Affairs Journal, he pointed out that “capping our low emissions would make very little 
difference to global warming but would seriously impede our development programs and 
                                                
19 See excerpts from Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha debates from Handbook Of Climate Change And India 
(edited by Dubash), p. 239. 
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nullify efforts to build up our coping capacity against climate change… this does not 
mean that we should do nothing to moderate the inevitable increase in our emissions. 
They are major opportunities for adopting cost-effective energy efficiency and energy 
conservation measures. These promote our development objectives, while also yielding 
import co-benefits for climate change mitigation” (C. Dasgupta, 2011, pp. 226-227). 
 
Conclusion 
The last decade witnessed the shift of India’s response to climate change, from 
inaction to proactive action. After 2007, India not only began to relax its rhetoric on 
international climate negotiations and pledge a voluntary quantified emissions reduction 
target, but also to adopt a set of strong domestic climate measures. After examining both 
international and domestic factors, this chapter finds that the transformation of India’s 
climate policy resulted from the creation of a strong pro-climate group because of 
interaction of international and domestic dynamics. Between the late 1990s and the mid-
2000s, India’s participation in the international environmental institutions helped further 
climate change mitigation on the domestic policy agenda by developing a diverse group 
of pro-climate actors. Growing international socialization with scientific knowledge of 
climate change drew attention to Indian climate experts, and prompted them to bring 
scientific aspects of climate change into climate policy debates. Also, because of 
economic opportunities provided by the CDM, business entrepreneurs also started to 
lobby for proactive climate policies. Another important international factor is increased 
international pressure on India, particularly because of the role that India desires to play 
on the world stage. In addition, changes in domestic dynamics enabled the pro-climate 
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group to increase its influence on climate policy. In particular, changes in India’s energy 
governance and climate bureaucracy expanded the pro-climate group with renewable 
industries and pro-climate bureaucrats. The shift of energy governance in the mid-2000s 
created a new link between energy security and climate change by developing renewable 
energies, and cultivating pro-climate actors in renewable industries. Meanwhile, the 
changes in the climate bureaucracy from 2008-2009 enabled the pro-climate bureaucrats 
to exert more influence to steer India’s climate policy development.  
It is worth noting that political opposition to a strong climate policy remained in 
India, especially regarding a legally binding international commitment, given India’s 
unfinished development tasks. This concern is reflected in the widespread opposition to 
Ramesh’s ambitious international commitments in 2009. Also, due to this strong 
domestic concern on the right to develop, while India has softened its rhetoric in climate 
negotiations, it has pledged a voluntary target rather than a legally binding one. Therefore, 
to reconcile economic development and climate change, India’s climate policy focuses on 
a co-benefits approach, aimed at linking climate action to domestic development plans, 
such as energy security and poverty eradication but to disconnect proactive domestic 
action from international commitment (Atteridge et al., 2012; Dubash, 2013; Thaker & 
Leiserowitz, 2014). This approach became evident after the end of Ramesh’s tenure as 
the Minister of the MoEF, the new Minister, Jayanthi Natarajan took a more traditional 
position at international climate negotiations than his predecessor (Isaksen & Stokke, 
2014; Never, 2012). 
The development of India’s response to climate change also presents a case study 
to look at environmental politics in the developing world, and offers insights into how to 
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engage developing countries with global climate governance. Like most developing 
countries, India is facing challenges from economic development and environmental 
protection, and has endeavored to keep a balance in between. If building a link between 
economic development and climate change control, India is able to ensure its 
development prospects are not compromised by climate change. Instead, these agendas 
could facilitate climate mitigation and adaption. 
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CHAPTER V 
CLIMATE POLITICS IN CHINA 
Climate governance in China presents a case study to understand why an 
authoritarian country would have a more ambitious climate policy than what the previous 
statistical model predicts. As an authoritarian regime that prioritizes economic 
development over environmental protection, it is surprising that China has begun to take 
substantial actions on climate change mitigation over the last decade. The Chinese 
government has proposed its own voluntary quantified emissions reduction target in 
international climate negotiations, and is starting to adopt a carbon-trading scheme, to 
increase investment on the development of green technology and renewable energy, and 
to set up domestic mandatory emissions cut target. China’s ambitious climate policies 
and plans are in sharp contrast to its previous conservative stance on climate change 
between the 1990s and the early 2000s, when the Chinese government was not only 
strongly opposed to binding conventions on climate change and skeptical of the IPCC 
findings, but also had few domestic climate actions (Chayes & Kim, 1998; Davenport, 
2012; Economy, 1997).  
The transformation of Chinese climate governance is puzzling. First, China is 
largely insusceptible to international pressure than countries that have accepted obligation 
to cut emissions based on the Kyoto Protocol. Second, as climate change is a public good, 
China is incentivized to rely on the efforts of other countries rather than taking any 
actions itself. Third, until 2009 China still had little domestic public support for climate 
change action. A national survey in 2007, for instance, found that the Chinese public did 
not see climate change as the most pressing environmental problem (Lo, 2010, p. 1015). 
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Also, a 2009 Pew Research Global Attitudes Project survey indicated that the Chinese 
public did not view climate change as the most serious problem and was less concerned 
about it than any of the public in the 24 other countries surveyed (Pew Research Center, 
2009).  
This chapter seeks to explain the transformation of China’s climate policy and to 
answer why China has changed its position on climate change since the mid-2000s. By 
examining the impacts of international institutions and China’s domestic politics on the 
shift in China’s climate policy, I argue that it is the interaction of these two dynamics that 
contributes to the development of a strong pro-climate policy community, thus, the 
emergence of a stronger climate policy. More specifically, international institutions 
helped to cultivate a pro-climate policy community through international socialization 
and economic incentives between the late 1990s and early 2000s. China’s domestic 
political dynamic, particularly the party-state leadership’s rising energy and 
environmental concerns between the early 2000s and mid-2000s, which strengthened the 
power of the pro-climate policy community. As these two dynamics work together, the 
pro-climate policy group, a diverse collection of domestic actors from the bureaucratic, 
scientific, and business communities, was able to advance their interests in the climate 
policymaking process, and then promoted China to adopt a proactive climate policy from 
the mid-2000s onwards.  
This chapter proceeds in three sections. The first section discusses changes of 
China’s climate policy at both the international and domestic levels. The second section 
focuses on how China’s integration into global environmental governance helped to 
develop a pro-climate policy group of Chinese experts, bureaucrats and businesses 
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through scientific and environmental discourses and economic incentives. The third 
section explores how the energy and environmental concerns of China’s top leadership 
provided an opportunity to strengthen domestic pro-climate support, transforming the 
country’s climate policy after the mid-2000s.  
 
Shift in China’s Climate Policy 
China’s climate policy has undergone a profound transformation over the last two 
decades, transforming from an aggressive opponent of carbon emissions reduction to an 
active proponent. In international climate negotiations, China’s attitude towards climate 
change has shifted from questioning the validity of climate change to proposing its own 
voluntary quantified target of climate mitigation (See Table 5). At the national level, 
China has made great progress by providing legislative and financial support for carbon 
reductions, ranging from renewable energy development to carbon pricing initiatives. 
From the mid-2000s onwards, China began adopting a range of policies that encourage 
carbon emissions reduction, including increasing energy efficiency, developing 
renewable energy and setting up authorities to manage CDM projects. This shift towards 
a proactive climate policy was further expanded after 2009 when, for the first time in a 
decade, the Chinese government made a pledge for a quantified emissions reduction 
target at the Copenhagen climate meeting. In 2010, it adopted a mandatory carbon 
reduction target in its 12th Five-Year Plan. In 2011, China initiated a pilot program of 
carbon trading. More recently, China proclaimed that it would adopt a national carbon-
trading scheme in 2017, and pledged to cap its carbon emissions by 2030. In the 
following section, the change in China’s climate policy is examined in more detail. 
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Table 5. Timeline of China’s climate policy.  
International 
Commitment  
No 
International 
obligation  
No quantified 
target 
No 
quantified 
target 
No 
quantified 
target 
No quantified 
target 
No 
quantified 
target 
Yes 
Voluntary 
quantified 
target 
pledged:  
40-45% cut  
Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
 
INDC 
target  
60-65% cut 
by 2030 
below 2005 
 
Domestic 
Action 
No climate 
policies;  
 
No mandatory 
energy 
intensity 
reduction goal 
No climate 
policies;  
 
No mandatory 
energy 
intensity 
reduction goal 
No climate 
policies;  
 
No 
mandatory 
energy 
intensity 
reduction 
goal 
Renewable 
Energy 
Law 
adopted. 
 
Mandatory 
energy 
efficiency 
target 
launched;  
 
 
China’s 
National 
Climate 
Change 
Program 
released;  
 
New 
Renewable 
energy 
development 
plan released  
 
Provincial 
Leading 
Groups on 
Climate 
Change 
constituted 
Golden Sun 
Program 
initiated;  
 
Renewable 
Energy law 
amended 
 
Low-
carbon 
cities 
program 
launched 
Pilot ETS 
scheme 
started; 
 
National 
FIT scheme 
introduced;  
 
Mandatory 
carbon 
emissions 
intensity 
target 
launched 
 
   National 
ETS 
scheme 
announced; 
 
Renewable 
energy plan 
enhanced 
Time  1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
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Changes in International Stance  
On the international front, China’s position in international climate negotiations 
has changed significantly over the last two decades. At an early stage of international 
negotiations in the 1990s, China was not only strongly opposed to any quantified 
mandatory emissions reduction imposed on developing countries, but also questioned the 
IPCC findings. At the Ministerial Conference of Developing Countries on Environment 
and Development in Beijing in 1991, China joined with other developing countries to 
adopt the Beijing Declaration, which indicated that “developed countries should be 
responsible for historical and current greenhouse gases emission… the ongoing 
negotiations cannot expect developing countries to accept any obligations in the near 
future” (Beijing Declaration, 1997). Meanwhile, China continued to be skeptical 
regarding the results of the IPCC findings and climate change science in general. During 
the 1995 intergovernmental negotiating committee for climate change, the Chinese 
delegation casted doubts on the data, arguing that “government could not base policy 
decisions on such scientific uncertainties” (Chayes & Kim, 1998, p. 524). While the 
Chinese government signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, “its resistance was crucial for the 
deletion of a draft Kyoto Protocol paragraph that allowed Non-Annex-I developing 
countries to set voluntary emissions targets” (A. Michaelowa, Shouchuan, Krause, 
Grimm, & Koch, 2003, p. 117). At the 1997 Kyoto climate meeting, China also expressed 
its objection to carbon trading, stating that “emissions trading may not contribute to 
actual reductions in emissions but shift reductions overseas” (Earth Negotiations bulletin, 
1997). 
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Meanwhile, China also had reservations regarding another flexible mechanism, 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and was worried that these mechanisms 
would allow developed countries to shirk their responsibilities (Hatch, 2003, p. 54). Some 
Chinese climate experts had expressed similar concerns about it and posited that this 
mechanism would harm the developing countries’ interests in the near future (H. Xu, 
1998; S. Xu, 2001). A senior climate expert from the SPC (former body of the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)), Xu Huaqing, pointed out that, “on the 
surface the so-called ‘Clean Development Mechanism’ seems to help developing 
countries deal with climate change, but in reality it allows developed countries and 
developing countries to implement the treaty together, and helps developed countries 
achieve the target of their emissions reduction” (H. Xu, 1998, p. 40). Thus, although 
China’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002 made it eligible for the CDM, it did not 
express great interest in developing CDM projects in the early 2000s (W. Lin, 
Heggelund, Tangen, & Li, 2004, p. 6).  
In contrast to its hesitation and reluctance to address climate change in the 1990s, 
China has become a more active proponent for climate mitigation since the mid-2000s. In 
2005, China adopted a set of guidelines and regulations for the CDM development and 
set up a national authority to manage CDM projects. With policy support, between 2005 
and 2007, there was a rapid development in CDM projects. By 2007, China had become 
the largest CDM host country (Schröder, 2011, p. 2). In 2009, at the Copenhagen climate 
meeting, China made a pledge of voluntary quantified emissions reduction. For the first 
time in the history of international climate negotiations, a developing nation had taken 
significant steps regarding climate mitigation (Hurrell & Sengupta, 2012, p. 471). This 
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move also suggested a partial break with China’s long-term objection to quantified 
targets.  
 
Changes in Domestic Climate Action  
In addition to the transformation of China’s policy in international climate 
negotiations, there has been a shift domestically since the mid-2000s. This change is in 
contrast to its previous actions between the 1990s and early 2000s, when few domestic 
climate actions and policies were enacted due to China’s strong reservation on carbon 
emissions reduction.  
Throughout the 1990s, few domestic climate actions can be found in China. 
China’s Five-Year Plan (FYP), one of the most important government documents that 
guide state economic development, barely mentioned climate change or global warming 
in its 8th FYP (1991-1995) and 9th FYP (1996-2000) (Government of People's Republic 
of China, 1991, 1996). Instead, special attention was given to the coal development and 
the ways to increase coal production and transportation. For instance, the 8th FYP aimed 
at building a set of power plants around coal production centers in coal-abundant 
provinces, such as Shanxi Province. In addition, the FYPs of the 1990s also paid less 
attention to renewable energy development. While they began to include new energy 
technology development in paper, they did not set up specific targets for it. Only until the 
10th FYP (2001-2005), contents on climate change mitigation had begun to appear in the 
FYPs (Government of People's Republic of China, 2001). 
From the mid-2000s onwards, China adopted a range of domestic climate policies 
and measures, including energy efficiency enhancement, renewable energy development 
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and carbon trading initiatives. Beginning in 2005, China began to set mandatory energy 
efficiency targets in its Five-Year Plan (FYP), a general economic and social 
development plan made by China’s top leadership every five years. In the 11th FYP 
(2006-2010), China set a target of 20% energy intensity reduction of the 2005 level by 
the year of 2010 (Government of People's Republic of China, 2006). It disaggregated this 
target into quotas for local governments as a “legally binding mandatory target” (法律效
力的约束性指标), and took the achievements of the target as an indicator for local 
governmental performance evaluation (政府绩效考核) and local cadre performance 
evaluation (干部政绩考核) (The State Council, 2006). During the 11th FYP, the central 
government also launched a “Top 1000 Energy-Consuming Enterprises Program” (千家
企业节能减排行动) for energy efficiency improvements in the industrial sector, which 
accounts for 33% of China’s energy consumption and a similar share of energy-related 
carbon emissions.20 This program was estimated to reduce 250 million tons of carbon 
dioxide by 2010.21 In 2007, China released its first National Climate Change Program, 
which targets energy efficiency and renewable energy development for carbon emissions 
reduction (Xinhua, 2007b). In 2010, the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) launched a pilot program to create “low-carbon cities” in five provinces and 
eight cities. Those participating provinces and cities were encouraged to develop low-
carbon local industries and build capacity for greenhouse gases reduction and energy 
efficiency (China’s Energy News, 2010). In 2011, China’s 12th FYP (2011-2015) took 
                                                
20 Detailed information can be seen: http://www.chinafaqs.org/library/chinafaqs-efficiency-thousand-
companies-time (Accessed in 10/13/2015). 
21 Ibid.  
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another considerable step toward energy efficiency improvement by proclaiming that by 
2015 the carbon emissions intensity would decrease by 17%, as compared to 2010 
(Government of People's Republic of China, 2011). To facilitate the implementation of 
this plan at local levels, quotas were assigned to the local government and linked to the 
promotion of local governmental officials (Xinhua, 2014). In 2016, China launched its 
13th FYP (2016-2020). The plan followed its previous path on mitigate climate change, 
and set up a mandatory target of 18% reduction in carbon intensity reduction by 2020 
(Government of People's Republic of China, 2016).  
Additionally, China’s growing proactive climate policy can be found in its 
ambitious plan for the renewable energy development. After the mid-2000s, China 
increased its legislative and financial support for renewable and low carbon energies. In 
2005, China passed the National Renewable Energy Law, which provides a principal 
framework for the development of renewable energy and offers a set of financial 
incentives and tax preferences for renewable energy projects (Academy of 
Macroeconomic Research, 2014, pp. 12-13). In 2007, China set up the Medium- and 
Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy, which aimed to increase the share 
of renewable energy consumption to 15% by 2020 with investments of 2000 billion RMB 
(around 333 billion USD) (The NDRC, 2007). With government support, China quickly 
emerged as the global leader in renewable energy finance and investment, as well as in 
renewable energy installation and production. By 2009, China had become the world’s 
biggest investor in renewable energy with a commitment of 34.6 billion, and the second 
in the world for renewable energy installed capacity (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2010, p. 
7). By 2010, China has also taken the top spot in wind turbine and solar cell production 
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(Bradsher, 2010). The shift of China’s policy was further promoted in 2011 when China 
initiated a pilot carbon-trading scheme in two provinces and five cities (The NDRC, 
2012). In 2015, China also announced plans to adopt a national carbon-trading scheme in 
2017, which signals China’s new ambition in limiting carbon emissions (Davis & 
Davenport, 2015). Meanwhile, in its latest submitted report on its Intended Nationally 
Determined Contribution (INDC), China aimed to increase the share of non-fossil energy 
in the total primary energy supply to 20% by 2030 (Government of People's Republic of 
China, 2015). 
As this brief overview suggested, China’s climate policy has undergone an 
important transformation since the mid-2000s. The following sections seek to explain this 
policy shift and explore under what conditions and in what ways factors from both 
international institutions and domestic politics have been able to shape China’s climate 
policy change. In particular, it takes a closer look at how international socialization and 
economic incentives helped generate a pro-climate policy community, and at how 
domestic political interests deriving from energy and environment concerns stimulated 
the development of this pro-climate group. When factors from the two levels work 
together and reinforce each other, they are able to strengthen the power of the pro-climate 
group, and then transform China’s climate policy.  
 
The Impact of International Dynamic  
The last three decades have witnessed China’s growing participation in the 
international environmental regimes. China has signed on to a range of international 
environmental treaties and committed itself to international norms and rules, as well as 
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developed extensive links with the scientific and environmental communities (Economy, 
2001; Falkner, 2006; Johnston, 1998; Kent, 2002; Schroeder, 2008). In the field of 
climate change, China has engaged in international climate negotiations since the early 
1990s. It signed on to the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and ratified it in 2002. China’s growing 
integration into global climate governance has provided domestic actors with access to 
scientific and environmental ideas about climate change, as well as to foreign 
investments and advanced technologies for addressing climate change. In this section, I 
examine how China’s participation in the international environmental regimes has had a 
profound impact on promoting a domestic climate change agenda and developing a pro-
climate policy community through international socialization and economic incentives 
during the late 1990s and the early 2000s.  
 
Scientific and Environmental Discourses 
Between the late 1990s and the early 2000s, growing socialization with the 
international scientific and environmental communities exposed China’s climate and 
energy experts to climate change concerns and impacts. With a wide range of bilateral 
and multilateral scientific and environmental activities, by the mid-2000s, China’s natural 
and social scientists had reached a consensus on the destructive effects of global warming 
on China, and began to bring scientific concerns of climate change into climate policy 
debates.  
International scientific cooperation regarding the environment and climate change 
has been ongoing since the 1990s, and contributed to developing an understanding of 
climate change among scientific and political elites (Economy, 1997). Like other 
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developing nations, China did not have a significant history of climate change research 
during international climate negotiations in the early 1990s. A number of international 
organizations and transnational NGOs, such as the United Nations Environment and 
Development (UNEP), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Resource 
Institute (WRI), provided support for Chinese scientists to develop climate change 
research while sharing scientific information and offering environmental training 
(Economy, 1997, pp. 24-25). For instance, one of China’s most influential research 
institutions on climate change, the Energy Research Institute (ERI), has obtained 
substantial scientific and financial support from scientific and environmental 
communities of the United States, Germany and the UK.22 As a senior climate expert 
from the ERI indicated, “The international exchange has gradually increased the Chinese 
experts’ understanding of climate change”.23 
However, China’s scientific and environmental communities did not forge a 
consensus on the impacts of climate change on China in the 1990s. In spite of extensive 
access to western scientific climate models, many researchers from the China 
Meteorological Administration (CMA) argued that the effects of climate change on China 
were uncertain and asked for further research before taking climate action (Economy, 
1997, p. 25). In contrast, experts from the State Environment Protection Administration 
(SEPA), emphasized the destructive impacts of global warming on every aspect of 
China’s society, and also credited international assistance in developing the research that 
led to the conclusion on the impacts of climate change (Economy, 1997, p. 26). Despite 
                                                
22 Interview with a senior researcher of the ERI. Beijing, August 6, 2014. Evidence can also be found in 
(Economy, 2001), p. 244; (Wübbeke, 2013), p. 723.  
23 Ibid.  
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gradual acceptance of the validity of climate change by scientific and political elites with 
environmental and scientific training from the international community, concern 
regarding the uncertainty of human effect remained (Luo, 1997; Zhao, 1999). A 1996 
report titled “Studies on Climate Change and Its Effects” from the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences called for further research to reduce the uncertainties in climate change 
(Economy, 2001, pp. 248-250). 
Between the early 2000s and the mid-2000s, the international socialization 
regarding climate change concern was further deepened with China’s increasing 
participation in the IPCC activities. The exchange of scientific ideas enabled the expert 
community within China to reach a consensus on the implications of climate change for 
the country, which promoted the issue on the domestic policy agenda. The Chinese 
government began to send increasing numbers of scientists to participate in the IPCC 
activities, particularly after its report had such an effect on international climate 
negotiations. As an influential climate expert stated, “the IPCC’s scientific assessment 
has become an international political arrangement. It shows the significant role of science 
in the international political decision-making process” (Pan, 2001). While only a few 
experts participated in the IPCC working progress throughout the 1990s, the number of 
participants has been increasing since the early 2000s (Chen, 2002). As the senior climate 
scientist Qin Dahe (秦大河) observed during his participation in the IPCC, “Chinese 
scientists’ achievements in climate change have benefited from their work in the IPCC ” 
(Technology Daily, 2013). 
China’s scientists’ active participation in IPCC activities transmitted climate 
change scientific knowledge and concerns into the domestic political arena. With the 
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release of the third IPCC assessment report in 2001, there was more and stronger 
evidence for a link between human activities and climate change. Based on this increase 
in the certainty of global warming, the Chinese scientists that participated in the working 
process of this report expressed their concerns on the effects of climate change on China 
and called for actions on further research on it (Qin, 2003). Ding Yihui (丁一汇), a senior 
Chinese climate expert and the co-chair of the Working Group I in the third IPCC report, 
stated that “climate change will have a lot of influence on our natural ecosystem and 
national economy. Some of the effects may be irreversible and catastrophic. Take early 
research and timely measures could reduce the adverse effects of climate change” (Ding, 
2002). 
Therefore, between the early 2000s and the mid-2000s, China organized its first 
national research program regarding the assessment of climate change on China. This 
program encompassed a number of leading climate and energy experts who also 
participated in the IPCC activities, such as Pan Jiahua (潘家华), Xu Huaqing (徐华清), 
Qin Dahe (秦大河), Jiang Kejun (姜克隽), Ding Yihui (丁一汇) and Zhou Dadi (周大地
). In this report, scientists combined the models of emissions scenarios from the IPCC 
with China’s own model to predict the effects of climate change on China (Ding et al., 
2006; E. Lin et al., 2006). They agreed that global warming would have substantial 
negative impacts on different aspects of China, such as agriculture, water resources and 
the ecological system (Ding et al., 2006; E. Lin et al., 2006). Given China’s vulnerability 
to climate change, these experts called for China’s active response to climate change and 
provided policy recommendations with a focus on a co-benefit approach. They suggested 
that “China’s current economic development is constrained by the limitation of natural 
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resources and environmental pollution, energy conservation and energy structure 
improvement will constitute the core of China’s energy strategy, which is also consistent 
with China’s climate change strategy” (He et al., 2006). 
 
Economic Incentives 
China’s integration into the international environmental governance has not only 
shaped domestic climate and energy experts’ attitudes towards climate change through 
socialization with scientific knowledge and environmental ideas, but also changed some 
bureaucrats and business groups’ interests in climate change through economic incentives 
from the early 2000s to mid-2000s. The potential opportunities of new investment and 
technology transfer from the international community motivated these domestic actors to 
pursue proactive climate policy.  
China’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002 made it eligible for the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) –a market-based mechanism that could bring 
investments and technologies to developing countries. However, the Chinese government 
still hesitated in developing CDM projects, this was, in part because of uncertainty in the 
CDM market caused by the U.S., Australia and Russia not ratifying Kyoto Protocol at the 
time (W. Lin et al., 2004, p. 6). However, between 2002 and 2005, the growing 
international cooperation on CDM projects generated significant benefits in China, which 
caused more support for them and a proactive climate mitigation policy by both 
government officials and business corporations.  
In 2002, government of the Netherlands planned to develop China’s first CDM 
project, the Inner Mongolia huitengxile wind farm development project (First Financial 
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Daily, 2005). The hosting company was expected to receive EUR 27 millions by 
developing this project. Later, in 2004, the Chinese State Forestry Administration and the 
Italian Ministry of the Environment, Land and Sea also decided to start investing in CDM 
projects in China (First Financial Daily, 2005). In early 2005, another CDM project, the 
Xiaogushan hydropower project, obtained an investment of $13.5 millions from the 
World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund (First Financial Daily, 2005). Against this 
background, China’s influential state-run newspapers cited the World Bank’s report on 
the CDM market, and showed that developing the CDM could bring billions of 
investment to China’s hosting companies, in addition to being a great opportunity for 
China’s renewable energy development (Guangming Daily, 2005; People's Daily online, 
2005a). Meanwhile, research reports from climate and energy experts also demonstrated 
the potential benefits China would gain from the CDM. A 2005 collaborative 
international research report involving experts from the ERI and Qinghua University also 
discussed opportunities and benefits from CDM projects. It emphasized that the CDM 
could benefit China with technology transfer, carbon emissions reduction and renewable 
energy development.24 In an interview with the People’s Daily, Liu Deshun (刘德顺), a 
co-author of the report and senior climate expert at Qinghua University, suggested that 
China should be proactive and take the opportunity to obtain funding and technology 
from developed countries (People's Daily online, 2005b). Another co-author and senior 
Chinese governmental official from the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), Lu 
                                                
24 The research is supported by the MOST, the World Bank, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (Germany) and Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs. See Lu Xuedu and Liu 
Deshun (2005). Clean Development Mechanism in China: taking a proactive and sustainable approach, p. 
72.  
 101 
Xuedu (吕学都), also viewed the CDM as a huge opportunity for China’s business 
groups and indicated that it would help to upgrade China’s energy industry as well as 
transform its energy structure (Southern Weekly, 2005). Lu also called for wide media 
coverage of the CDM to increase the participation of China’s business community 
(Southern Weekly, 2005).  
As a result of success during the early development of the CDM in China and the 
potential economic benefits behind this mechanism between 2002 and 2005, it helped 
develop a set of domestic actors that supported climate change mitigation with this 
market-based approach. Within the central government, there was even an institutional 
competition among government agencies for influence on the CDM (W. Lin et al., 2004, 
p. 6; Schröder, 2011, p. 67). The long-time pro-climate agency, the MOST, and the 
powerful agency responsible for climate policy, the NDRC, competed for political 
influence on the CDM market (Schröder, 2011, p. 67). The NDRC took over major 
responsibility for the CDM from the MOST in 2004, and became actively involved in the 
development of CDM projects. To strengthen management of the CDM domestically, 
China established a national authority in 2004 to oversee the projects. The NDRC, MFA 
and the MOST as core members (Government of People's Republic of China, 2004). 
Furthermore, following the enactment of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005, China’s highest-
level climate policy coordination center, the Chinese National Coordination Committee 
on Climate Change, set up detailed measures to guide the development of the CDM 
(Government of People's Republic of China, 2005). 
In addition to the change of government agencies’ attitude toward climate change 
in the central government, the CDM also motivated the participation of China’s local 
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governments and business community in climate change mitigation, especially in 
renewable energy development to some extent (Lewis, 2010; Qi, Ma, Zhang, & Li, 2008). 
In the face of large economic benefits generated from the CDM, a number of provinces 
not only set up regulations and guidelines for CDM projects development, but also 
established provincial CDM centers for training and capacity development (Qi et al., 
2008, p. 389; Schröder, 2011, p. 8). For instance, by realizing benefits from the CDM, a 
local government official from Ningxia Autonomous Region spoke with the MOST 
regarding establishing a specific organization for CDM development, which later 
developed into China’s first CDM center in 2003 (Schröder, 2011, p. 69). By 2007, China 
had already set up 27 provincial CDM centers at the local level (Xinhua, 2007 ). In 
addition, provinces such as Shanxi and Gansu set up a leading government group to 
manage CDM projects and issued detailed guidelines for the CDM respectively (Qi et al., 
2008, p. 389). Provinces with large CDM potential, including high carbon emissions or 
geographic advantages in renewable energies, are more enthusiastic about the CDM than 
others. It is not surprising that Shanxi Province –China’s biggest coal-producing region, 
and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, China’s largest wind power potential 
region, became active participants in the CDM (Schröder, 2011, p. 55). At the same time, 
the CDM also influenced the business community’s attitudes toward climate change. The 
renewable energy industries, particularly the wind energy industry, had been enthusiastic 
about applying for CDM projects, given potential economic benefits from the CDM and 
policy support from the central and local governments. For instance, the state-owned 
power company, the China Huaneng Group, began to develop wind power CDM projects 
with a Spanish power company in 2005 (Xinhua, 2006a). China’s largest wind power 
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producer, Longyuan Power Group, also became an active participant in the CDM, and 
had developed 36 CDM projects by 2007 (Guangming Daily, 2007). China’s wind power 
report from 2007 indicated that “90% of non-concession wind projects have applied to be 
registered under the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM since 2005” (J. Li et al., 2007, p. 49).  
As discussed above, China’s participation in international institutions cultivated a 
pro-climate policy community. Between the late 1990s and the early 2000s, through 
socialization with international scientific and environmental groups, international 
institutions enabled China’s climate and energy experts to develop a consensus on the 
urgency of climate change in China and to bring these scientific concerns into climate 
policy debate. Through economic incentives such as the CDM, international institutions 
also stimulated climate mitigation by government officials and business groups.  
However, the strength of this international forces-induced pro-climate policy 
community remained relatively weak in the early 2000s. First, while climate and energy 
experts promoted the rise of climate change on political agenda in China, their influence 
on climate policy decision-making was limited in the context of China’s political system. 
As a top-down, centralized and authoritarian country, China’s policymaking process is 
centered on a bureaucratic bargaining among different government agencies, and its 
policy decisions are outcomes of deliberations between bureaucratic institutions 
(Lampton, 2001; Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988). It is the government agencies that have 
played the most important role in the climate policymaking. For this reason, a developing 
pro-climate actor in the business community, the renewable energy industry, also played 
a marginalized role in climate policymaking. It was at an early stage of development in 
the early 2000s, and was too weak to impact the political agenda.  
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Second, as noted earlier, bureaucrats from the MOST and the NDRC all expressed 
interest in the CDM. However, the multiple roles and responsibilities the NDRC had 
assumed made it difficult to move beyond a moderate climate policy. The NDRC is the 
primary government agency responsible for climate policy, as well as the top policy 
center for China’s economic and energy policies (Heggelund, 2007, p. 171). The Chinese 
leadership has prioritized economic growth over environmental problems so the NDRC, a 
government agency responsible for economic growth, stable energy supply and national 
climate policy, must also prioritize economic development and energy security when 
formulating policies on climate change. Besides the NDRC, the MOST has been a pro-
climate actor and enthusiastic supporter for the CDM, but its weak administrative power 
has made it unable to change bureaucratic deliberation in favor of strong climate policy.  
On balance, the international dynamics with international socialization and 
economic incentives developed a pro-climate policy community in China between the 
late 1990s and the early 2000s. However, this newly developed group was not politically 
influential in changing climate policy deliberations at the time. The next section 
examines how the domestic dynamics worked with the international dynamics to 
strengthen the pro-climate policy group in China, which made China become a proactive 
actor in climate change policy.  
 
The Impact of Domestic Dynamic 
Due to international dynamics, a pro-climate policy community was able to 
develop and promote climate change concerns in the domestic political agenda between 
the late 1990s and the early 2000s. At the same time, changes in the domestic political 
 105 
dynamics reinforced the impact of the international dynamics, and contributed to 
strengthening the power of the pro-climate group. This section examines the impact of 
China’s domestic politics, and focuses on how domestic political concerns worked with 
the international dynamics to increase the influence of the pro-climate group, which 
turned China into an ambitious actor on climate change. Particularly, this section first 
discusses growing legitimacy challenges China faced between the early 2000s and the 
mid-2000s, and explores how the Chinese top leadership’s growing environmental and 
energy concerns for regime legitimacy influenced domestic actors’ approaches and 
attitudes towards climate change since the mid-2000s. It then looks at how these 
challenges gave a boost to the pro-climate group and shifted the results of bureaucratic 
bargaining to one favoring a proactive climate policy.  
 
Challenges to China’s Legitimacy 
After the decline of the revolutionary and charismatic authority in the post-Mao 
period, the Chinese party-state leadership sought legitimacy elsewhere to assert its 
authority (Laliberté & Lanteigne, 2007; Lampton, 2001). The introduction of 
performance legitimacy with a focus on high rates of economic growth allowed the CCP 
to maintain its political power (Burns, 1999; Gilley & Holbig, 2009; Laliberté & 
Lanteigne, 2007). The party-state leadership has emphasized the significance of 
economic growth ever since the start of China’s reform and opening up policy in the 
early 1980s, and has made a set of guidelines and rules to ensure stable economic 
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development.25 However, since the early 2000s, this major source of legitimacy, strong 
and positive economic performance, has been challenged by energy demand and 
environment degradation.  
There is no denying that China’s rapid economic growth has driven a sharp 
increase in its energy consumption. However, between 1980 and 2002, China’s 
leadership had been able to manage an energy-efficient economic growth with a set of 
governmental policies and financial incentives (Zhou, Levine, & Price, 2010, p. 2439). 
During this time period, there was an average annual decline of 5% in energy intensity, 
which allowed China to quadruple its GDP, but merely doubled the amount of its energy 
consumption (Lewis, 2013, p. 8). However, this situation began to change in 2002. 
Energy intensity increased an average of 3.8% per year between 2002 and 2005 (Lewis, 
2013, p. 8). For the first time in decades, China’s energy consumption began to rise more 
quickly than its economic growth (Aden & Sinton, 2006, p. 253; Lewis, 2013, p. 8). The 
surging energy demand and limited energy supply began to affect China’s economic 
development and people’s daily life. Since 2002, China has confronted power shortages 
in almost every year, which have led to power cuts or blackouts in a lot of areas, 
particularly the coastal provinces where China’s economic boom is concentrated (China 
Daily, 2003). To ease the power crunch, some local authorities have rationed electricity 
distribution and encouraged people and the industries to limit energy use (Lim, 2004). 
This energy shortage situation became worse in 2004. Most coal power plants were 
running on a very low coal stock of less than 15 days, and 24 provinces suffered power 
                                                
25 The reports of the CCP Party Congress have centered on policies and rules regarding economic 
development since the 11th CCP Party Congress. Details can be found in the archive of the CCP’s National 
Congress: http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64563/index.html (Accessed by 11/1/2015). 
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cuts during peak hours (China Business, 2004; People's Daily Online, 2004). It was 
estimated that increasing power shortages would even reduce the growth rate of China’s 
GDP by 0.5% in 2004 (China Business, 2004). The salience of the energy issue and its 
adverse impact on the economy started to worry China’s senior leadership. In 2005, the 
central committee of the CCP had a collective study session about the issue of China’s 
energy resources, then-president Hu Jintao indicated that “the energy issue is a major 
strategic issue for China’s economic and social development” (Xinhua, 2004). Later that 
same year, in the first conference for the establishment of the National Energy Leading 
Group, Premier Wen Jiaobao, pointed out that the “energy problem is an important 
strategic issue that matters to China’s economic development, social stability and national 
security” (Xinhua, 2005c).  
In addition to the energy issue, another challenge to China’s performance 
legitimacy is the fragile ecological environment (Hsu, 2014; A. Wang, 2013). China’s 
unprecedented economic growth has taken a heavy toll on the environment, especially on 
its air and water quality. As energy consumption surged between 2000 and 2005, China’s 
coal consumption increased by 75%, which made China the world’s largest source of 
sulfur dioxide emissions (World Bank, 2007, p. xi). Additionally, about 54% of the seven 
main rivers in China contained water deemed unsafe for human consumption (World 
Bank, 2007, p. xi). The worsening condition of the environment has also caused 
significant public health and economic damages. The concentration of particles in the air 
has caused an increasing rate of respiratory illnesses in urban China, and the frequency of 
acid rain has caused large economic losses by destroying agriculture and building 
structures(World Bank, 2007, pp. xiii-xvi). Aside from this, there has been growing 
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public dissatisfaction with environmental pollutions since the early 2000s. In 2005, the 
number of environmental appeals and letters received by the Chinese Environmental 
Protection Bureaus reached to 608, 245, which is ten times higher than those received in 
1995 (Jing, 2010, p. 197; Tong, 2013, p. 237). Nearly half of these letters and complaints 
were about air pollution (Van Rooij, 2010, p. 62). Meanwhile, an increasing number of 
people have used demonstrations and protests to express their discontents with 
environmental deterioration. Environmental mass incidents (环境群体性事件) have 
increased at an annual rate of 29% since 1996 (Tong, 2013, p. 236). These violent 
demonstrations have become a new source of social instability. One typical example is a 
pollution protest in Dongyang, Zhejiang province in 2005, which received much attention 
from the media and government officials (Xinhua, 2005a; Yardley, 2005). In his 
discussion of environmental mass incidents, then-chief director of provincial 
environmental protection bureau in Zhejiang indicated that “environmental disputes have 
become the new cause of social instability…if being used by a small bunch of ill-willed 
individuals, could seriously damage the Party-Mass relationship and the Party’s image” 
(Ma, 2008/2009, p. 46). During a speech in 2005, then-governor of Zhejiang Province 
and current president of China, Xi Jinping, emphasized that “environmental mass 
incidents could destroy the fruit of reform and opening up” (Ma, 2008/2009, p. 47). 
 
Climate Governance under Legitimacy Consolidation  
Between the early 2000s and mid-2000s, as noted above, the soaring energy 
demand and worsening environment posed new challenges to China’s economic growth 
and worried China’s party-state leadership. At the same time, these new challenges also 
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provided opportunities for the pro-climate policy community to obtain support from 
China’s leadership. This section explores how the response of the Chinese authorities to 
the energy demand and environment degradation strengthened the power of the pro-
climate group in bureaucratic bargaining by shaping government agencies’ interests in 
climate change, and causing China to develop a more proactive climate policy.  
 
Maintaining Legitimacy  
The traditional pattern of China’s economic growth is usually characterized as 
“high-volume of investment and consumption of energy and natural resources, heavy 
pollution, and low efficiency” (People's Daily Online, 2005). As discussed previously, 
this model of economic development put tremendous pressure on China’s top leadership. 
In response, starting in 2004-2005, the party-state leadership began to stipulate a set of 
policies and measures to transform the traditional pattern of economic growth, so as to 
ease China’s energy shortage and environment deterioration. In its 5th plenary session of 
the 16th CCP Central Committee in October 2005, the CCP issued their proposal for 
China’s 11th Five-Year Plan, and emphasized that “[we] must increase the transformation 
of economic growth. The capacity of our land, water, energy, raw materials and 
environment has constrained economic development.”26 Later that year, an editorial from 
the Xinhua News also indicated that “it is time to end the ‘coarse form (粗放型) of 
economic growth… economic development should be based on high efficiency of energy 
use and low environmental pollution with focusing on quality and efficiency” (Xinhua, 
                                                
26 The CCP Party Congress report. (October 11, 2005). The CCP’s proposal on the eleventh Five-Year 
Plan. http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64569/65414/4429220.html (Accessed by 11/06/2015).  
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2005d). Another influential official journal run by the CCP, Ban Yue Tan (半月谈), also 
showed that “it is urgent to transform the economy…the way to sacrifice environment 
and destroy resources for economic growth is costly” (Xinhua, 2005e). In early 2006, the 
CCP emphasized the significance of transforming the pattern of economic growth by 
holding a collective study session for the CCP Politburo members. Then-president Hu 
Jintao pointed out that “only by accelerating the transformation of the form of economic 
growth can we promote economic development to be harmonious with population, 
resources and environment, and ensure the sustainable development of our economy and 
society” (Xinhua, 2006b). 
In addition to transforming the pattern of economic growth, China’s party-state 
leadership also sought a new ideology that focused on the environment in guiding 
economic development. The CCP started to develop the idea of “ecological civilization (
生态文明)” between 2002 and 2005, when China’s economy was facing pressure from 
energy shortages and environmental degradation (People's Daily Online, 2012b). 
President Hu Jintao mentioned the significance of eco-civilization on China’s economic 
development at the 2004 Population Resource and Environment Work Conference 
(Xinhua, 2004). Later, in his speech to the provincial leaders regarding how to strengthen 
the CCP governing capacity in 2005, Hu emphasized the significance of ecological 
environment construction, and he pointed out “our current ecological situation is grim, 
and local environmental pollution problems are very serious. As population increases and 
people’s standards of living improve, the contraction between economic and social 
development and the resources and the environment will be more prominent” (Xinhua, 
2005b). In the CCP’s 17th Party Congress in 2007, the CCP officially introduced the 
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concept of “ecological civilization” and put it in the party’s political report for the first 
time. This is widely regarded as a response to China’s traditional form of economic 
growth, and a strong signal for a shift in China’s economic and environmental policies 
(Xinhua, 2007a). In a speech to party delegates in the 17th party congress in 2007, Hu 
Jintao stated, “To build the ecological civilization, [we] need to form a pattern of 
economic structure, growth and consumption with energy saving and environmental 
protection, and to establish a large-scale circular economy and increase the proportion of 
renewable energy sources. Also, [we need to] control the discharge of major pollutants 
effectively and improve environmental quality significantly” (Xinhua, 2007c). This 
inclusion of “ecological civilization” in the CCP’s political report shows the party-state 
leadership’s plan to depart from the long-term one-sided pursuit of GDP growth.  
 
Strengthening the Power of the Pro-Climate Group  
As discussed above, after the mid-2000s, China’s leadership developed a new 
pattern of economic growth with energy saving and environmental protection, in part 
because of legitimacy consolidation. They began to set up a series of policies to 
encourage the transition to a new economic model. This change enabled the pro-climate 
policy community to develop and exert greater influence on climate policy debate. First, 
within the Chinese bureaucracy, perhaps the most important change was that the 
powerful NDRC joined the pro-climate group after the mid-2000s. As the major 
government agency responsible for China’s economic, energy and climate change 
policies, the NDRC began to emphasize energy efficiency and conservation and 
renewable energy development, which made the institution a leading actor in domestic 
 112 
climate action. In addition, China’s growing environmental concern has also strengthened 
the power of pro-environmental officials in the inter-agency bargaining on climate 
change. Second, working outside of the governmental bureaucracy, climate experts and 
renewable energy industry also gained more power to influence climate policy decisions. 
The increasing energy and environmental concerns of the Chinese leadership gave them 
an opportunity to advance their interests, including objectives in line with a proactive 
climate policy.  
The shift of the economic growth model for the sake of legitimacy consolidation 
has influenced government agencies’ approach and attitude to climate change since the 
mid-2000s. In particular, it has strengthened the power of the pro-climate group in the 
central government. One prominent change lies in the NDRC, which was a hard-liner for 
conservative climate policy, but which now become an effective actor on the issue. As 
discussed earlier, the NDRC took over the responsibility of climate change from the 
SMA in 1998. It is also the agency in charge of China’s economic and energy policies. 
As China’s top leadership called for transformation of economic growth pattern, the 
NDRC has begun to stipulate a set of policies and measures to promote economic 
development with energy efficiency and pollution reduction, including China’s 11th Five-
Year Plan with a mandatory target of energy intensity reduction in 2005, the Medium- 
and Long-Term for Renewable Energy Development Plan in 2007, which also produced 
benefits for climate mitigation. As the former director of the NDRC, Ma Kai (马凯) has 
said “China has to manage the relationship between economic development and 
environmental protection in its process of modernization. We cannot follow the 
traditional pattern of industrialization with high-volume of resources consumption and 
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pollution emission, but to take a new path of industrialization with low consumption, low 
emission, high efficiency and high output, so that we could achieve a ‘win-win objective’ 
in economic development and environmental protection. [Those efforts] will also 
contribute to the world’s sustainable development and climate change” (People's Daily 
Online, 2007). A government official from the NDRC also indicated that “as China’s 
economy is facing great pressure from rising costs of labor and energy, it has become 
urgent for China to promote economic transformation so as to avoid ‘the middle income 
trap’…this economic transformation shares the same objectives with climate change 
mitigation”.27  
The NDRC’s approaches to climate change with a focus on economic and energy 
objectives have become conspicuous after the State Council set up an inter-agency group 
for climate change in 2007. The full name of this leading group is the National Leading 
Group on Climate Change, Energy Saving and Pollution Reduction. Its members include 
ministers or vice-ministers from 27 ministries and commissions, and it focuses on two 
different objectives. In fact, it is a special inter-agency institution with two different 
objectives (one agency, two titles: 一个机构，两块牌子) (The State Council, 2007). In 
other words, it is the same group of officials that deal with two different objectives: the 
Leading Group has two separate titles, one is the National Leading Group on Climate 
Change (NLGCC), and the National Leading Group on Energy Saving And Pollution 
(The State Council, 2007). The general office of the leading group for daily work is in the 
NDRC. This set-up also signals that China’s climate action is closely linked to energy 
saving and pollution reduction. In addition to this, in 2007, the NDRC worked with other 
                                                
27 Interview with a government official of the NDRC in Beijing: August 21, 2014.  
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government agencies to issue China’s first National Climate Change Program. In the 
report, it showed that China’s climate actions are centered on energy and industry sectors, 
and emphasized the methods China was using to mitigate climate change, including 
transforming the economic growth pattern, developing renewable energy, improving 
energy efficiency and increasing forestation (Xinhua, 2007b). 
Since climate change mitigation shares similar objectives with energy saving and 
pollution reduction, the NDRC has become more supportive of climate actions. In 2008, 
the NDRC established the Department of Climate Change (气候变化司) to set up climate 
change policies, develop plans and supervise China’s climate negotiations. This change 
increases the NDRC’s administrative power in international negotiations, which had been 
handled by the MFA. Also, this new department is headed by a veteran climate negotiator 
from the MFA, Su Wei (苏伟).28 Meanwhile, the NDRC appointed a strong 
environmental proponent –Xie Zhenhua (解振华) as the deputy director of the NDRC in 
charge of domestic energy saving and pollution reduction as well as international climate 
negotiations, which was viewed as a positive signal that China had begun to take climate 
change seriously (Garnaut, 2009). As a former environmental administrator with strong 
efforts to promote environmental protection, Xie’s environmental background made him 
a rising star, he quickly became the top climate official in China and played an important 
role in promoting China’s national climate actions (Garnaut, 2009). The NDRC also set 
up another research institution, the National Center for Climate Change Strategy and 
International Cooperation (NCSC) in 2012, to deal with climate change, especially 
                                                
28 Interview with a senior climate expert of the ERI in Beijing: August 6, 2014. 
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research on strategic planning, regulations, carbon markets and information consulting 
(Xinhua, 2012). This center is headed by Li Junfeng (李俊峰), who served as president of 
a pro-climate association, the Chinese Renewable Energy Industries Association 
(CREIA), and is an active official in promoting China’s renewable energy development.29 
In addition to the changes at the NDRC, the Chinese leadership’s concern 
regarding environment degradation gave a boost to pro-climate actors in the bureaucracy 
system, such as the SEPA, which has taken a proactive stance on climate change since 
the beginning of China’s climate negotiations.30 In the face of mounting environmental 
crisis, the central government upgraded the SEPA to the minister-level MEP in 2008 and 
declared environmental protection as one of China’s top national priorities (The Beijing 
News, 2008a). This arrangement also allows pro-environmental officials to have a say in 
inter-agency bargaining on climate change. It also ensures that the MEP could play a 
more important role because the nation’s air pollution, especially smog, has worsened 
since 2010, primarily due to coal. In fact, the MEP has begun to develop collaborative 
programs to address both air pollution and climate change. It cooperated with the MOST 
and launched a “blue sky science and technology project” (蓝天科技工程) to promote 
the research and development of technologies for simultaneously dealing with air 
pollution and climate change mitigation (People's Daily Online, 2012a). In addition to the 
MOST, the MEP has a new ally: the Ministry of Finance (MOF). Both of them have been 
supportive of the adoption of carbon tax since 2008, and they have been developing the 
details for the carbon taxation in recent years (China Dialogue, 2012; The Beijing News, 
                                                
29 Interview with a senior climate researcher from an international think tank in Beijing, August 14, 2014 
(a). 
30 See (Economy, 1997). 
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2008b). The MOF and the MEP even had some institutional infighting with the NDRC. 
The MOF and the MEP have had some jurisdictional quarrels with the NDRC over the 
adoption of a carbon tax. Rather than instituting as an environment-related tax, the 
NDRC would prefer to establish it as an energy-related tax. This would ensure 
jurisdiction for the National Energy Administration, which operates under the NDRC 
(China Economic Weekly, 2013). While governmental institutions have different 
perspectives on jurisdiction control, it is important to note that they are no longer hesitant 
to enact measures to mitigate climate change.  
As Chinese authorities have shifted their focus on the new low-carbon economic 
model since the mid-2000s, climate and energy experts are able to push their climate 
change concerns in climate policymaking. In 2007, China set up the National Experts 
Committee on Climate Change (国家气候变化专家委员会). This is an official think 
tank that includes leading Chinese climate and energy experts and serves as a policy 
advisory organization for China’s climate policy (Sina News, 2009). China’s influential 
climate and energy research institutions, such as the Research Center for Sustainable 
Development (RCSD) under the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), and the 
Institute of Energy, Environment and Economy (the 3E institute) from the Tsinghua 
University, and the ERI under the NDRC, all have members who sit on this committee, 
which allows them to have better access to climate policymaking. As a senior climate 
expert recalled, “when we started research on China’s low-carbon development, ‘carbon’ 
remained a sensitive topic … but this resistance gradually disappeared in 2009”.31 
Another leading climate expert from the ERI also shared a similar experience. When his 
                                                
31 Interview with a senior climate expert from an international think tank in Beijing, August 14, 2014 (b). 
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research team suggested the adoption of the low-carbon city and carbon trading in 2005 
and 2006, it failed to get the support of the leadership.32 However, the plan gained 
attention in 2007 after then-President Hu Jintao made an announcement to develop low-
carbon economy in China.33 Policy suggestions from climate and energy experts also 
started to appear in China’s climate policy decisions. For instance, the voluntary 
emissions reduction target China proposed in 2009 Copenhagen meeting is based on the 
ERI’s research work.34 
China’s top leadership’s concerns on economic growth and energy security also 
provided an opportunity to further the growth of renewable energy industry, and then to 
strengthen the pro-climate group. After the Renewable Energy Law took effect in 2006, 
the renewable energy industry obtained a set of policy and financial support from both 
the central and local governments, such as power purchase mandates and preferential 
loans (Z. Wang, Qin, & Lewis, 2012). Between 2005 and 2008, there was rapid 
development in China’s renewable energy industry. While it was a newly emerging 
sector in China, and is highly dependent on state intervention, its interaction with local 
governments made it become an important player in the transformation of climate policy 
in China. Driven by local GDP growth and a “green” political image, local governments 
offered policy support for both wind and solar manufacturing industries, ranging from 
subsidized land to tax breaks (J. Li et al., 2012; Southern Weekly, 2013). There was even 
competition among local governments for attracting manufacturing producers (Southern 
Weekly, 2013). Meanwhile, a growing demand for wind turbines and solar panels from 
                                                
32 Interview with a senior researcher of the ERI. Beijing, August 6, 2014. 
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid.  
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the international market also stimulated the development of renewable energy industry. 
Due to the proliferation of wind and solar manufacturing industries, China quickly took 
over global leadership in wind turbine and solar panels in terms of production capacity in 
2009. These changes within the renewable energy industry allowed it to exert influence 
on China’s climate policy, especially on renewable energy policy. Since China’s 
renewable energy development prioritized production capacity over installation capacity, 
it found itself in a situation of overinvestment and overcapacity after the global economic 
downturn, with a shrinking overseas market during 2008 and 2009 (S. Zhang, Andrews-
Speed, Zhao, & He, 2013, p. 347). Therefore, renewable energy manufacturers and 
producers started to lobby governments for incentives and subsidies. This pressure played 
a crucial role for the Chinese government to develop renewable energy deployment 
capacity, and then set up China’s first FIT (Feed-in-Tariff) scheme in 2011.35  
Due to legitimacy consolidation concerns from China’s top leadership, the pro-
climate group was able to advance their interests in climate mitigation and facilitate the 
adoption of a proactive climate change policy. In China’s bureaucracy, the powerful 
NDRC shifted from a conservative actor to an active player in climate policy, as it was 
able to integrate climate change concern into China’s economic and energy policies. The 
marginalized MEP, took advantage of an opportunity to push for climate mitigation, as 
carbon emissions share similar objectives with air pollution control. Outside China’s 
bureaucracy, China’s leadership’s concerns also helped climate experts and the 
renewable energy industry to push climate mitigation onto the domestic policy agenda. 
                                                
35 Interview with a climate policy analyst from an international think tank in Beijing: August 7, 2014; See 
also (S. Zhang & He, 2013), p. 397.  
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Conclusion 
Authoritarian China’s proactive climate actions is presented as an “off-the-line” 
case of the statistical model, which predicts that non-democratic countries are less likely 
to take ambitious climate policies. By examining the impacts of international institutions 
and domestic political system on the shift in China’s climate policy, this chapter finds 
that the two international and domestic dynamics played different roles in transforming 
China’s climate policy through a pro-climate policy community. International institutions 
facilitated the emergence of a pro-climate policy group with international socialization 
and economic incentives between the late 1990s and the early 2000s. However, the 
domestic political dynamics during the early 2000s and mid-2000s strengthened the 
power of this pro-climate group, and enabled it to push a proactive climate policy after 
the mid-2000s. The concerns over legitimacy by the senior leadership played a crucial 
role in this process. It was these concerns that gave the pro-climate group the ability to 
prevail in the bureaucratic struggles over climate policy. The change in the leadership’s 
attitude towards climate change is largely due to their concern with maintaining high 
rates of economic growth, something which is becoming increasingly difficult because of 
China’s vulnerable resource-intensive economy and fragile ecological environment. 
Since the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party depends crucially on its ability to 
deliver high rates of economic growth, the party leadership seeks to develop a low-carbon 
economy with economic transformation and higher energy efficiency. The development 
of a low-carbon economy coincides with the objectives of climate change mitigation. 
Thus, the party leadership’s focus on economic transformation and greater energy 
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efficiency empowered the pro-climate group that pushed for policies designed to reduce 
carbon emissions, and transformed China into a proactive actor on climate change.  
In addition, the case study of China’s climate action offers insight into a debate 
over authoritarian environmentalism (Beeson, 2010; Gilley, 2012). As an authoritarian 
country, China is able to formulate and promulgate a wide array of climate policies 
quickly, and disaggregate targets and goals for climate action into different levels of 
government with political mandates to push for emission reduction and energy efficiency. 
However, by developing climate policies around economic performance with limited 
public participation, it remains to be seen how far China’s proactive climate action will 
go. However, the analysis of climate governance in China presents a case study to see 
how developing countries address environmental problems while facing pressures from 
economic development. By establishing a linkage between economic development and 
climate mitigation, it may be possible for developing countries to keep development 
sustainable.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
In this concluding chapter, I review the evidence provided in data analysis and 
case studies. The quantitative data indicates the significant effects of international 
institutions and political system on the strength of climate policy. The case studies trace 
casual processes in the interplay of international and domestic politics. Together, these 
two pieces of evidence indicates that the emergence of a strong climate policy is due to a 
strong pro-climate policy group, which developed from the interaction of international 
institutions and a shift in domestic politics. After summarizing the findings, this chapter 
ends by considering the implications of my research for theory and practice.  
 
Summary of the Findings 
This section examines findings from the quantitative data and qualitative 
evidence, and discusses whether these results have given support to the hypotheses about 
factors that influenced the strength of climate policy in developing countries.  
Table 6. Results of empirical work.  
 Data Analysis  On-the-line Case: 
India  
Off-the-line Case: 
China 𝐻!!: Scientific and environmental discourses  + + + 𝐻!!: Economic incentives  + + + 𝐻!: Political system + + - 𝐻!: Domestic interest groups  - + + 𝐻!: Environmental NGOs  - - - 𝐻!: Economic development  - - - 𝐻!: Local air pollution  - - + 
Note: “+” indicates “confirms hypothesis”, and “-” indicates “fails to confirm”.  
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The empirical work of my study is to test the following hypotheses about factors 
that affect the strength of climate policy in developing countries. The statistical analysis 
generated a preliminary correlation between these hypotheses and the strength of climate 
policy, and a confirmation of core hypotheses, including scientific and environmental 
discourses, economic incentives and political system. The case studies provided further 
confirmation of the results of the statistical model by tracing causal processes between 
international and domestic politics. This section discusses how the statistical work and 
case studies complemented one another, providing different support to understand the 
adoption of a strong climate policy in developing countries.  
The effects of international institutions (𝐻!! and 𝐻!!) received strong support in 
both the statistical work and case studies, as indicated in Table 6. The statistical analysis 
identified the correlation of international institutions and the adoption of strong climate 
policy. The case studies of India and China provided further evidence to support the 
result with detailed investigation in the interaction between international and domestic 
actors. They suggest that international socialization and economic incentives shaped a 
developing country’s climate policy by cultivating pro-climate actors with roots in the 
scientific and business communities. In both cases, the country’s growing participation in 
international institutions such as the IPCC, promoted scientific knowledge exchange 
between domestic experts and the international epistemic community, and allowed the 
former bringing scientific aspects of climate change on domestic policy agenda. The 
economic incentives from the CDM under the Kyoto Protocol provided an opportunity 
for these countries to access to foreign investment and technology transfer, which 
stimulated the business group’s interests in climate mitigation.  
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The influence of political system (𝐻!) received strong support in the statistical 
analysis, but mixed support in the case studies. This discrepancy is due in part to case 
selection. The case of India is an on-the-line case, but the case of China is an off-the-line 
case. The statistical work indicated that democratic regimes are positively correlated with 
the adoption of strong climate policy. The on-the-line case, India, bolstered the finding by 
tracing the causal mechanism. It suggests that democracies foster deliberation on climate 
change among different groups and allow them to compete for their favored climate 
policies. Climate policy is the result of a compromise between those favoring policies 
that alleviate climate change and those who oppose such policies. However, the 
investigation of an off-the-line case, China, is trying to understand why a non-democratic 
regime has strong climate policy than the statistical analysis predicted. This case 
illustrated that regime type might be less important than regime legitimacy in shaping 
climate policy, which also offers a new glimpse to understand the effects of political 
system on national environmental policymaking process.  
The effects of domestic interest groups (𝐻!) received little support from the 
statistical work, but moderate support from the case studies. This difference is due in part 
to the limitations of data quality and availability. The proxy used to measure the 
influence of domestic interest groups did not fully capture the complexity and dynamics 
of interest groups in the developing world. The case studies of India and China all 
indicate that the exposure of the businesses to economic incentives from the international 
community stimulated their interests in climate mitigation. In the two cases, evidence 
shows that the business group lobbied the government for access to carbon market.  
 124 
One hypothesis (𝐻!), the impacts of environmental NGOs, received little support 
in both the statistical work and case studies. The case studies indicated that the effects of 
environmental NGOs in shaping climate policy are limited. Part of the reason is, as the 
case of India indicated, environmental NGOs are focusing more on pressing domestic 
environmental problems, such as water resources exploitation than global environmental 
issues, like climate change (Dubash, 2013; Lele, 2012). In addition, the case of China 
illustrated that domestic environmental NGOs is a latecomer on climate change, so they 
usually focus more on promoting the implementation of climate policies and increasing 
public awareness of climate change, and less likely to get directly involved in 
policymaking.36 Besides, both cases showed that climate change is viewed more as a 
development issue but less as an environmental issue, which could also discouraged the 
active participation of environmental NGOs.  
A similar situation holds for another hypothesis (𝐻!). Both the statistical analysis 
and case studies refute that high economic development affects the adoption of strong 
climate policy. Instead, the cases of India and China suggest that maintaining economic 
growth could become an impetus for the adoption of strong climate policy. Both 
countries chose to develop economic and energy policies with co-benefits for climate 
change given their growing concern on energy supply and clean energy development 
competition in the global market.  
Another hypothesis (𝐻!), local air pollution, received little support from the 
statistical work and on-the-line case of India, but strong support in the off-the-line case of 
China. Therefore, it is hard to conclude that local air pollution has a generally significant 
                                                
 36 Interview with a representative of an environmental NGO in Beijing: August 13, 2014. 
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effect on the adoption of strong climate policy in developing countries. However, lessons 
we can draw from China’s experience is that, the salience of air pollution in China’s 
domestic politics played an important role to prompt the government to take a proactive 
climate policy. The Chinese top leadership’s growing concern on fragile ecological 
environment empowered the pro-climate policy community and allowed them to advance 
their interests in climate policymaking process.  
In general, the qualitative evidence in India and China provide further 
confirmation of the results of the statistical model by tracing causal processes in the 
interactions between international and domestic politics. They demonstrate how 
participation in international institutions is influencing the strategies and positions of 
domestic actors on climate change. In addition, they further illuminate the relationship 
between political system and the strength of climate policy. As the case of India 
illustrates, democracies foster deliberations on climate change among different elite 
groups and allow them to compete for their favored climate policies. Climate policy is the 
result of a compromise between those favoring policies that alleviate climate change and 
those who oppose such policies. One of the lessons we can draw from the Chinese 
experience, on the other hand, is that regime type may be less important than regime 
legitimacy in shaping the strength of a country’s climate policy. It is the top leadership’s 
focus on strengthening the legitimacy of the regime that has given those pro-climate 
actors the ability to prevail in the bureaucratic struggles over climate policy.  
In addition, the case studies of India and China offer a comparative perspective to 
look at how different domestic dynamics shaped climate policymaking process and 
policy output in these two countries. Particularly, the difference of the salience of climate 
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change in domestic policy agenda has played an important role in both countries’ climate 
politics. The case of India indicates that climate change is a concern shared for different 
elite groups but not an issue for party politics (Dubash, 2013; Prabhu, 2012; Vihma, 
2011). In this sense, climate policy debates center on a deliberative process in which 
different elite groups compete for their preferred policy, and the policy outputs reflects a 
compromise of their perspectives. However, the case of China illustrates that climate 
change has become a concern for Chinese leadership given its negative effects on 
economic performance. The support of Chinese leadership is a crucial determinant for the 
success of the pro-climate group in a bureaucratic bargaining. Therefore, the policy 
outputs reflect state interests instead of a compromise. Different domestic dynamics also 
help to explain why China’s movement to a strong climate policy is faster than India after 
the mid-2000s, as climate change is a more salient political issue in China than it is in 
India.  
 
Implications for Theory and Practice  
This study is motivated by an interest to understand and explain why some 
countries adopt ambitious domestic policies to deal with global environmental problems, 
and have four implications for our understanding of global environmental politics.  
First, my research on climate politics in developing countries adds to our 
understanding of when and how international institutions matter in environmental 
politics. As explained in the preceding chapters, international institutions helped to 
encourage the emergence of a pro-climate domestic group at an early stage of developing 
countries’ participation in international negotiations. Through scientific and 
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environmental discourses and economic incentives, international institutions facilitated 
the development of this pro-climate group with roots in scientific, business and 
bureaucratic communities. This internationally induced climate-conscious group has 
played a significant role in shaping developing countries’ response to climate change. 
Particularly, the group has brought scientific and economic aspects of climate change into 
domestic policy debates and promoted climate policy agenda. In addition, my research 
offers insights into long-standing questions in the international relations regarding the 
interaction of international and domestic politics. It focuses on how this interplay has 
affected developing countries’ adoption of strong climate policies by looking at the role 
of a domestic pro-climate group. It examines how international institutions influenced 
domestic climate policy debates through the creation of a pro-climate group, and 
illuminates how domestic politics facilitated this pro-climate group to advance their 
interests in climate governance.  
Second, my research contributes to our understanding of the nature and extent of 
domestic politics in global environmental governance, and offers a new lens for exploring 
domestic interest-group dynamics. The findings of my research demonstrate the 
importance of domestic politics in shaping national climate policy. Specifically, they 
suggest that domestic political dynamics promoted the emergence of a strong climate 
policy by strengthening the political influence of a pro-climate group. Additionally, my 
research provides a fuller understanding of the “Baptist and bootlegger coalition” in 
environmental politics (DeSombre, 2000; Hochstetler & Viola, 2012; Yandle & Buck, 
2002). By examining the pro-climate group with a diverse set of domestic actors, the 
study finds that a loose policy coalition with different interests but similar policy 
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objectives can work together to promote their preferred environmental policy on political 
agenda, because in so doing can increase their political influence with broad political 
support.  
Third, my research suggests that regime legitimacy may be even more important 
than regime type. Scholarship on environmental politics posits that democratic countries 
are more willing to address environmental problems than nondemocratic ones 
(Congleton, 1992; Neumayer, 2002; Payne, 1995). By contrast, my research finds that 
authoritarian developing countries will attempt to address environmental issues if the 
latter begins to challenge their governance legitimacy. As the case of China indicates, 
China’s adoption of a strong climate policy is due in part to Chinese authorities’ concern 
with environmental degradation and its negative effects on high rates of economic 
growth. As the legitimacy of the Chinese party-state leadership rely heavily on its 
delivery of good economic performance, China’s authorities seek a new economic model 
that coincides with the objectives of climate mitigation. Therefore, China’s leadership’s 
focus on economic transformation provided an opportunity to strengthen the power of a 
pro-climate group and enabled them to prompt China to adopt a strong climate policy. 
Additionally, through the case of China, my research adds to our understanding of 
authoritarian environmentalism (Beeson, 2010; Gilley, 2012; Moore, 2014). Given the 
important role played by the party-state leadership in China’s climate policymaking 
process, my research suggests that environmental governance in authoritarian regimes 
with limited public participation still mainly reflects state interests, and an effective 
bottom-up approach to environmental policymaking has to align their policy objectives 
with state interests.  
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Finally, this study shed light on the development of international environmental 
policies in developing countries. Policies of developing countries have drawn less 
attention from scholars, with most research focusing on the climate policies of developed 
countries. By ignoring the role of the Global South in dealing with these pressing global 
environmental issues, we are ill-prepared to engage with both heavy carbon emitters and 
rapidly industrializing economies in addressing climate change. My research can mitigate 
the gap in the existing literature, as well as position us to better understand how 
developing countries are able to deal with climate change in different ways within their 
borders. In addition, my study of climate politics in developing countries provides 
another perspective in how to balance environmental protection and economic growth, as 
a large amount of literature has focused on how developing countries address 
environmental issues in the face of pressures from economic development. It suggests 
that developing countries are more likely to deal with global environmental problems 
when policy solutions take local economic development and environmental issues into 
consideration and develop a co-benefit approach that benefits the global environment and 
local economy. 
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